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I. INTRODUCTION: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
Everyone knows why courts order busing. Segregated schools saddle
blacks with an inferior education. Blacks are disadvantaged enough in Amer-
ican society. If segregated schools reinforce a correspondence between race
and class, so that race becomes caste,' then society should eliminate them.
Integrate. Bus.
Such remedial goals are laudable; one might even say that they are morally
implicit in a system that embraces ideals of individual "merit." 2 Busing,
Numerous commentators have considered the self-perpetuating nature of pov-
erty, and the particularly intractable poverty of blacks as a group. See, e.g., Lewis,
The Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY 187-200 (D. P. Moynihan
ed. 1969); Clark, A Matter of Race, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 25;
Gershman, A Matter of Class, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
Commentators also have acknowledged the significance of the caste-like nature of
race in America. See, e.g., B. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 17
(1973) ("[A]s slavery receded into the background, it was succeeded by a caste
system embodying white supremacy."); Yudof, Nondiscrimination and Beyond: The
Search for Principle in Supreme Court Decisions, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 108 (W. Stephan & J. Feagin eds. 1980) ("Integration is part
and parcel of the undoing of a caste system that consistently, over long periods of
time, has disadvantaged Black Americans.").
2 A "meritocratic system" rewards individuals according to the value of their
contributions to society. Such a system can encompass either a market mechanism of
distribution or control by a welfare state. The justice of such a system can be
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nevertheless, is a controversial issue in American political discourse. Social
scientists question its effectiveness. 3 Supreme Court Justices question its
wisdom. 4 Significant sectors of the public oppose it-even purported
beneficiaries'-and Congress has considered restricting the jurisdiction of
understood in at least two ways. The first focuses on maximizing social wealth-
individuals who contribute most to the social "good" should be most rewarded. This
notion of justice cannot accommodate a remedial ideal that seeks to compensate for
social disadvantages suffered by individuals unless the short-term costs in efficiency
are outweighed by long-term gains in productivity. The second view of a meritocracy
places as its cornerstone the just treatment of the individual. Skills are still rewarded
to the extent society values them; there is no socialistic distribution of wealth
according to need. But this view contains the fundamental notion that all individuals
have the right to realize their innate skills, so that each person has an equal chance to
compete in the meritocratic system of distribution. True "merit" can be rewarded
only when the process gives an equally fair chance to each person.
For a discussion of the concept of merit and racial justice, see Fallon, To Each
According To His Ability, From None According To His Race: The Concept Of Merit
In The Law Of Antidiscrimination, 60 B.U.L. REV. 815 (1980) (The concept of
"merit" must be considered in the context of fundamental social goals and values.).
3 See, e.g., Court Ordered School Busing: Hearings on S. 528, S. 1005, S. 1147, S.
1647, S. 1743, and S. 1760 before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 150 (1981) (statement of
Herbert J. Walberg, Professor of Education, University of Illinois, Chicago) [here-
inafter cited as Senate Hearings] ("[B]using for purposes of school desegregation has
not proven significantly helpful on average to the learning of either majority group or
minority students.").
4 See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 469 (1979) (Burger, J.,
concurring) ("It is becoming increasingly doubtful that massive public transportation
really accomplishes the desirable objectives sought."); id. at 483-89 (Powell, J.,
dissenting) ("Experience... has cast serious doubt upon the efficacy of far-reaching
judicial remedies directed not against specific constitutional violations, but rather
imposed on an entire school system on the fictional assumption that the existence of
identifiable black or white schools is caused entirely by intentional segregative
conduct, and is evidence of systemwide discrimination."); Keyes v. School Dist. No.
1, 413 U.S. 189, 247-48 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting) ("Any child,
white or black, who is compelled to leave his neighborhood and spend significant
time every day being transported to a distant school suffers an impairment of his
liberty and his privacy.").
I Black residents of Boston, for example, have expressed discontent with the
court ordered assignment of students in Boston's desegregation case. See Boston
Globe, March 12, 1982, at 1, col. 1 (poll showing that 79% of black parents in Boston
favored a plan allowing them to choose the schools their children will attend). One
faction of plaintiffs has advocated that the district court abandon student assignment
formulae in favor of a "freedom of choice" assignment plan coupled with court-
mandated improvements in educational quality. These plaintiffs, however, neither
identified the constitutional source nor justified the scope of their proposed alterna-
tive remedy. See generally Boston Globe, Nov. 19, 1982, at 15, col. 1 (discussing
district court's rejection of plaintiffs' motion for proposed "freedom of choice"
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the federal courts to order busing as a remedy for proven constitutional
violations .6
However scrutinized in political debate, busing as a legal remedy has not
been adequately analyzed. 7 The critical relationship between right and rem-
edy has not been demonstrated because the underlying constitutional right
has never been precisely defined. From the earliest pronouncements, the
right to be free from racial discrimination in public education was not
supported by clear normative precepts. "Separate but equal" was deemed
constitutionally permissible; the doctrine embraced some notion of equality,
but equality in what sense and toward what end was never quite clear.8
assignment plan because it "lacked sufficient detail to determine whether the plan
would be 'constitutionally adequate' and 'administratively feasible' "). For the back-
ground of the Boston case, see Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.
1974) (finding of liability) and Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975)
(remedy).
6 In the fall of 1981, for example, the Senate and House of Representatives
considered a series of bills that would have curtailed the power of federal courts to
order busing as a remedy. Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 150, passim. Senate bill
S. 528, The Neighborhood School Act of 1981, was designed to "establish reasonable
limits on the power of courts of the United States in the imposition of injunctive relief
in suits to protect the constitutional rights of individuals in public education ......
Id. at 671. The bill would have severely restricted federal judicial power to "order or
issue any writ ordering directly or indirectly any student to be assigned or to be
transported to a public school other than that which is nearest to the student's
residence ...... Id. at 673.
These hearings also provide some insight into the domination of political consid-
erations in the congressional debate. In his opening remarks, Senate Subcommittee
Chairman John P. East solemnly noted that busing "is a matter of vital public
importance. It is a major political issue. It has tremendous importance and ramifica-
tions in American politics .... So it is in that spirit that I, as chairman of this
subcommittee, approach the matter." Id. at 2. Significantly, Senator East did not
mention the constitutional rights of black students anywhere in his opening remarks.
See id. at 1-2.
7 Even those Supreme Court Justices who question the wisdom of busing have
not focused on the proper relationship between right, harm, and remedy. Rather,
they have based their evaluations on extraneous considerations such as local auton-
omy. See, e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 483 (1979) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (noting that the district court order improperly dismantles neigh-
borhood schools "in the face of compelling economic and educational reasons for
preserving them"); id. at 489 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasizing "complete
... displacement of local authority").
I The phrase "separate but equal" does not define clear constitutional principles.
What does it mean for the state to provide equal educational facilities to separate
racial groups? Must there be an equal expenditure per student? Must each racial
population as a whole receive equal funds, so that the population with fewer constit-
uents would receive more funds per student? For a murky treatment of the "equal-
ity" requirement under the regime of "separate but equal," see Cumming v.
[Vol. 63: 1
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Today, after nearly a century of development, the right remains fuzzy and
obscure, encompassing competing doctrinal and normative strands.
Contemporary problems of normative and doctrinal ambiguity began in
1954 with two landmark Supreme Court decisions. In Brown v. Board of
Education, 9 the Court declared racial segregation in public education uncon-
stitutional under the fourteenth amendment; in Bolling v. Sharpe,'0 the
Court invalidated purposeful segregation under the fifth amendment."I But
there was a more significant distinction in the rationales underlying these
two decisions, a dichotomy that plagues the evolution of constitutional
doctrine even today. Although Boiling employed what has now become
standard equal protection analysis relating legislative means to legislative
ends, 12 Brown focused on the quality of education provided to minorities,
holding that purposeful segregation is unconstitutional because it affords
minority students unequal educational opportunity. 13 Brown did not discard
the "separate but equal" doctrine, but reinterpreted its applicability in the
realm of public education.
1 4
As a consequence of this doctrinal dichotomy, case law since 1954 purport-
ing to frame the right against racial discrimination in education has devel-
oped in the context of competing normative precepts. The different consti-
tutional values of Brown and Boiling both justified the proscription of
affirmatively imposed segregation. 15 Subsequent cases, however, have
proscribed other forms of segregation, only tenuously related to intentional
state policy. For these other forms of segregation, the distinction between
the constitutional values pursued by Brown and Boiling is critical.
Richmond Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (rejecting challenge to locality's failure
to provide high school facilities for blacks by suggesting that relevant question was
not whether county should close white high school or open black high school, but
whether it should close black elementary schools and open black high school).
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
II Bolling provided the Court's first explicit pronouncement that the principles of
equal protection apply to the federal government through the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. But c.f. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(The Court, without specifying the textual origin of its constitutional analysis, and in
the context of a suit against the United States, declared that "all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.").
12 For an early analysis of these equal protection principles, see Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
'1 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94 & nn.10-11.
14 See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
15 In Brown, segregation had been imposed by mandatory statutes. Schools were
designated as white or black, district lines were gerrymandered, and children were
required to attend a particular school despite the fact that another school might be
closer to their homes. 347 U.S. at 486-88. In Boiling, "minors of the Negro race . ..
were refused admission to a public school attended by white children solely because
of their race." 347 U.S. at 498.
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This Article analyzes the parameters of equal protection in the context of
public education. After identifying and separating the various normative and
doctrinal strands that have pervaded judicial analysis since 1954, it recharac-
terizes the constitutional right against racial discrimination in education as a
right of equal educational performance. It then demonstrates why the rem-
edy of busing is inadequate to compensate fully for a violation of that right.
Finally, this Article proposes principles upon which to frame an alternative
remedy that responds to both the normative premises of the right and the
underlying causes of educational deprivation.
II. STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THREE FORMS OF SEGREGATION
Courts have perceived the denial of educational rights primarily in terms
of racial segregation ever since Brown. Segregation in schools, however, is
not a simple, single phenomenon; it may be the product of several different
causes. Different forms of segregation may be classified according to the
extent of the government's role in creating racially identifiable demographic
patterns. Although the Court has not adequately distinguished among these
various forms of segregation, an analysis of the underlying constitutional
right requires that they be carefully defined.
The first form of segregation invalidated by the Supreme Court was the
product of a governmental policy, either explicit or covert, to separate the
races in public schools.1 6 Explicit segregation, sometimes referred to as
"southern segregation," exists when a state or school district designates
particular schools as "white schools" or "black schools" and requires
students to attend the schools "appropriate" for their race. 17 A covert
policy of segregation, occasionally termed "northern segregation," may be
effected if, for example, a local school board racially gerrymanders school
attendance zones, so that race and school coincide. These forms of affirma-
tive segregation, which I shall term first order segregation, eschew an
economically rational neighborhood assignment policy; although a neigh-
borhood might be integrated, the government purposefully expends effort
and resources to create a segregated educational system.' 8
The Supreme Court also has held a second form of segregation to be
constitutionally cognizable. Such racial separation, which I shall call second
order segregation, reflects the demographic effects of past invidious state
action. Gerrymandered attendance zones, for example, designed to achieve
a segregated educational system, might influence the development of resi-
dential patterns. Whites might be discouraged from locating in an area that,
16 Brown, 347 U.S. at 487-88, 495.
7 See, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (rejection of Chinese student's
challenge to assignment in "colored" school).
s See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (governmental




under an economically rational school assignment policy, would have been
served by a racially mixed school, but because of segregative gerrymander-
ing, was served by an all black school. Similarly, blacks might be econom-
ically foreclosed from residing in areas served by all white schools. 19 A
school district formerly without discrete, racially identifiable neighborhoods
might develop segregated residential patterns if the invidious governmental
policies are sufficiently long-lived to work their evil effects. These demo-
graphic patterns linger even after the offending governmental entity ceases its
affirmative discriminatory practices.
Thus, second order segregation is the product of a contemporary policy of
neighborhood school assignment implemented in a system encompassing
segregated residential patterns shaped by past invidious state actions. 20 The
extent of second order segregation is that increment of segregation caused
by the proscribed past state actions. Current invidious intent plays no role in
defining a second order constitutional violation. 2 1
In the final category of segregation, or third order segregation, neither
current invidious intent nor past state policy plays a doctrinally relevant role.
Third order segregation in public schools exists whenever a school district
applies a neighborhood assignment policy to segregated neighborhoods, thus
yielding segregated schools. How those neighborhoods originally became
segregated is irrelevant. Under a constitutional doctrine proscribing third
order segregation, any segregation in the public schools would be illegiti-
mate. State remedial responsibility would be triggered whenever a school
district operates a segregated system, regardless of whether segregated
communities were promoted in the past.2 2
III. THE Brown/Boiling DICHOTOMY
A. Two Theories of Right
The Supreme Court legitimized first order segregation when it extended
the Plessy v. Ferguson23 doctrine of "separate but equal" to public educa-
tion.2 4 Affirmative state action to separate school children by race was held
19 Economists suggest that price is a function of supply and demand. Property
values would increase in the area surrounding a school designated for white children
because of greater competition among white families for those homes. Less wealthy
black families who might previously have lived there would be forced to relocate.
20 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971).
21 In the case of a second order violation, current intent may be benign or even
remedial. Second order segregation is defined solely by past invidious intent and the
current consequences of actions undertaken with that intent.
22 For a discussion of third order segregation and principles of "state action," see
infra note 159.
23 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
24 See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
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constitutionally permissible so long as the state provided equal tangible
facilities to each group. 25 Equal protection doctrine, however, did not re-
main static. Beginning with the Japanese internment cases after World War
11,26 courts began to scrutinize racial classifications with special care. Under
this mode of analysis, courts presume that racial classifications are em-
ployed with constitutionally proscribed discriminatory intent. This presump-
tion can be rebutted only if such classifications are tailored to promote
compelling governmental interests. 27 In 1954, a challenge to racial segrega-
tion in education succeeded under this developing body of equal protection
doctrine; in Boiling v. Sharpe,28 the Court declared segregation in public
education to be unconstitutional.
29
Boiling, however, has been all but forgotten in the body of law defining
unconstitutional discrimination in the realm of public education. In Brown v.
Board of Education,30 decided on the same day as Boiling, the Court also
declared segregation unconstitutional, but rested its holding on an entirely
different legal theory. Brown's legal premise-ambiguous, unique in the
contemporary constitutional context,3 and encompassing a powerful reme-
dial potential-has shaped and confused the development of the doctrine
ever since.
Although the Brown court concluded that "in the field of public education
the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place, ' 3 2 the Court did not
repudiate the doctrine of "separate but equal" in principle. Rather, the
Court found as a factual matter that purposeful racial separation stigmatizes
minority children, promotes their self-perception of inferiority, and thus
deprives them of equal educational opportunity.3 3 In establishing Brown's
critical legal premise-that the state must provide minority children with the
25 Brown, 347 U.S. at 488 ("Under [Plessy's] doctrine, equality of treatment is
accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though
these facilities be separate.").
26 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
27 Id. at 216.
28 347 U S. 497 (1954).
29 Id. at 500. The Court held that "[s]egregation in public education is not rea-
sonably related to any proper governmental objective." Id.
30 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31 The significant disparity in the legal rationales of these two cases has perhaps
been obfuscated by Brown's reknowned use of social science data to support its
factual presumption that purposeful segregation psychologically harms minority stu-
dents. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 717 (1975) (discussion of
social science data and factual presumption).
32 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
33 Id. at 493-94. "To separate [school children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone." Id. at 494.
[Vol. 63: 1
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opportunity to learn as effectively as white children learn34 -the Court
departed from the definition of "equality" envisioned under the regime of
Plessy. The Constitution no longer required equality merely in tangible
facilities; rather, it required that blacks and whites benefit equally from
public education. Under the rationale of Brown, affirmative segregation was
constitutionally infirm only because it impeded the educational potential of
minority children; the constitutional evil in Brown resulted from the fact that
minority children did not have the opportunity to learn as much as white
children. Had the Court not invoked its factual theory of psychological
harm, separation would not have been deemed to impede educational oppor-
tunity, and in the context of Brown's analytical framework, segregation
might have remained within the discretion of local officials.
35
In focusing on the separation side of the "separate but equal" equation,
the Court logically fashioned a remedy eliminating the state-imposed segre-
gation. The Court might, however, have authorized a remedy addressing the
equality component of the equation. 36 Because the policy of racial separa-
tion was constitutionally proscribed only because of its effect on educational
opportunity, the Court might have sought other forms of relief which could
equalize educational opportunity for minority children. The Court arguably
could have achieved the desired result by requiring the government to
provide tangibly superior facilities for students in minority schools. By thus
balancing the advantages gained from superior tangible facilities against the
impediments to learning caused by forced separation, the Court could have
cancelled out inequalities, providing "net" equal protection to black stu-
dents. But the Court chose the alternative route-it presumed equal tangible
facilities, postulated inequality engendered by separation, and in Brown H, 37
required a remedy attacking segregation. 38 District courts were directed to
34 For a similar analysis of the right defined in Brown by a central participant in the
1954 litigation, see Carter, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF
BROWN 20 (D. Bell ed. 1980):
While we fashioned Brown on the theory that equal education and integrated
education were one and the same, the goal was not integration but equal
educational opportunity. Similarly, although the Supreme Court in 1954 believed
that educational equality mandated integration, Brown requires equal educa-
tional opportunity. If that can be achieved without integration, Brown has been
satisfied.
Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
35 If the fight consists of equal educational opportunity, segregation is unconstitu-
tional only if it denies that right.
36 See Bell, A Model Alternative Desegregation Plan, in SHADES OF BROWN 125
(D. Bell ed. 1980); Carter, supra note 34, at 27.
37 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
Brown Il].
38 In Brown's context of first order segregation, see Brown, 347 U.S. at 484 n. 1,
the Supreme Court surely chose the more appropriate remedy. If the state compro-
mised equal educational opportunity by imposing psychological harm through segre-
gation, such educational harm may be most easily and effectively remedied by
eliminating segregation. Legislation mandating or permitting segregation may be
1983]
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issue decrees requiring that minority children be admitted to public schools
in a racially nondiscriminatory manner "with all deliberate speed."
39
Boiling and Brown thus were predicated on distinct theories with diver-
gent emphases. 40 Boiling employed the classification analysis typical of
contemporary equal protection doctrine. Its ultimate concern was legislative
intent and the legitimacy of the "democratic" process. Brown, however,
focused not on the classifications employed, but on the substance of the
education provided by the state and the disparate benefit received by minor-
ity and white children. By retaining the analytical framework of "separate
but equal," which developed before the expansion of equal protection doc-
trine in the area of racial classifications, the Court focused on a notion of
substantive equality. Brown's significant contribution was in changing the
substance of what the Constitution required from equal tangible facilities to
equal educational opportunity. 41
B. The Extent of State Responsibility
The Brown/Boiling dichotomy is significant not simply because the two
cases are predicated on different theories of right and pursue different values,
but also because the cases imply different predicates of state responsibility.
repealed, gerrymandered district lines redrawn, and students admitted to neigh-
borhood schools on a nondiscriminatory basis. Such action eliminates the theoretical
basis of the psychological harm, thus curing the unequal educational opportunity.
A remedy that addressed the equality component of the "separate but equal"
principle would not as effectively vindicate the particular deprivation in Brown's first
order setting. A remedy seeking to compensate for psychological learning impedi-
ments by providing superior tangible facilities is no more than an indirect, band-aid
solution. Indeed, such an approach could even exacerbate the psychological harm by
demonstrating how much the white majority is willing to pay to remain isolated from
the black majority. Moreover, a remedy requiring tangible superiority would be
inappropriate in the context of first order segregation because it necessitates addi-
tional state initiative into uncharted territory. By ordering the elimination of ger-
rymandering and unifying school attendance zones, the Court simply seeks to undo
what has affirmatively been done. The remedy prescribed by the Brown court thus
eliminates the constitutionally proscribed harm in an administratively efficient man-
ner. In the context of second and third order segregation, however, a remedy
focusing on tangible superiority has quite different implications. See infra notes
127-35 and accompanying text.
39 Brown H, 349 U.S. at 301.
40 Why did the Supreme Court employ the developing "suspect classification"
equal protection analysis in Boiling and the more substantively-oriented analysis in
Brown? Perhaps the Court had been waiting for the opportunity to create an equal
protection component within the fifth amendment. Furthermore, the far-reaching
analysis of educational opportunity was more appropriately placed in the context of
the fourteenth amendment because the states were the predominant violators of the
constitutional right.




Although Bolling's equal protection analysis logically proscribes only first
order segregation, the remedial implications of Brown extend to tird order
segregation.
Bolling's doctrine, concerned with the classification of individuals accord-
ing to the criterion of race, reflects the principle that the government may not
act with discriminatory intent. The intent to treat people differently because
of race corrupts the democratic process. Because the doctrine proscribes
discriminatory intent, and not differential treatment per se, courts will up-
hold racial classifications if they are shown to be necessary to achieve a
compelling governmental objective. 42 A doctrine that values democratic
decisionmaking, and that examines governmental actions only to uncover
invalid motivation, logically should consider only contemporary governmen-
tal intent. If the government acts with legitimate purpose today, any discrim-
inatory impact caused by the effects of past action should be irrelevant.
Once contemporary classification and discriminatory intent cease, the dem-
ocratic process is pure, and Bolling's principles are no longer implicated.
The Brown decision has far broader implications for the extent of state
liability. Although Brown was decided in the context of first order segrega-
tion, contemporary state intent was not an element defining the underlying
right. Plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated because their educational
progress was inhibited by intentional segregation. Minority students inter-
preted the government's intent to separate as a mark of inferiority. 43 Thus
stigmatized, their sense of self-worth, and consequently their motivation and
educational potential, were smothered. In determining whether a school
district had violated the rights of the plaintiff class, the Court asked whether
black students received the same benefits from public education as did white
students. The constitutional question focused on whether intentional segre-
gation had impeded the educational progress of black students .44 Invidious
state intent was merely the factual predicate causing the constitutional evil
of unequal educational opportunity.
It might be argued, however, that because the government did intend to
establish racially segregated schools, Brown cannot stand for a right which
proscribes discriminatory educational impact unrelated to discriminatory
governmental intent. But this argument confuses the intent to accomplish a
legitimate goal with the intent to accomplish a proscribed goal. The govern-
ment always intends to accomplish certain objectives. When those objec-
tives are not illegitimate, neither is the underlying intent. In Brown the intent
to separate had no more significance than the intent to provide public
education or the intent to provide equal tangible facilities to each group; in
42 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944). InKorematsu, the
Court held that although "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect," id. at 216, the challenged clasgifications were
legitimate wartime security measures.
43 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
" See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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separating the races, the government simply intended to accomplish an
otherwise legitimate objective.
The government's intent to separate played a significantly different role in
Boiling than it did in Brown. Under the Boiling branch of equal protection,
the intent to treat racial groups differently is itself the proscribed evil; the
intent to separate is itself the proscribed element of governmental conduct.
In Brown, the Court did not consider whether the defendant school boards
had acted with the intent to hinder the educational progress of minority
students. The intent to separate was irrelevant because separation itself was
not at issue. Intent thus played no doctrinal role in Brown; it was not a legal
element defining the underlying right and the governmental violation.
Brown thus can be read to imply a third order right, a right with powerful
remedial implications. By changing the focus of equality in the "separate but
equal" equation from tangible resources to educational quality, Brown can
be interpreted to stand for the principle that a group of disadvantaged
minority children has the right to benefit from public education to the same
extent as does a relevant group of whites. 45 Any contemporary educational
deprivation suffered by minority children would violate a third order con-
stitutional right.
IV. DEFINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT: JUDICIAL DOCTRINE
A. Swann: The Watershed Toward Second Order Confusion
Although first order segregation was slowly eradicated in the years follow-
ing Brown and Bolling, segregated schools remained. Second and third order
segregation, irrelevant in the context of Bolling's concern with the process
of governmental decisionmaking, become significant in the context of
Brown's concern with educational quality if they impede equal educational
performance.
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 46 the Supreme
Court declared that the Constitution required more than the elimination of
first order segregation. In a move unprecedented in the doctrine of equal
protection, the Court created a second order right. 4 7 The Constitution now
proscribed the continuing effects of past intentional discrimination in public
education.
Swann began as a case about first order segregation. Prior to 1954, the
Charlotte-Mecklenberg school system had been operated under a regime of
segregation mandated by state and local law.48 In purporting to discharge its
41 For a discussion of principles defining equality of average educational perfor-
mance among groups of minorities and whites, see infra note 107 & Section VI A.2.
46 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
47 Id. at 20-21, 26, 28.
48 Id. at 5-6. The case was litigated in two phases. After the initial phase involving
first order segregation, see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 243 F.
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responsibilities under Brown and Brown H, the school board implemented a
system of geographical school attendance zoning between 1962 and 1965, but
failed to bring ten schools within the geographical assignment system.
49
These ten black schools remained governed by the old system of race-
conscious assignment modified by a "free choice" transfer plan permitting
students to opt out of their assigned schools. Black school children and their
families challenged the board's remedial measures as constitutionally inade-
quate, alleging that the school board's recent rezoning and its failure to
eliminate affirmatively imposed segregation from those ten schools were
motivated by invidious intent.5 0
At this stage, Swann presented a clear first order violation. A school board
had allegedly gerrymandered attendance zones to maintain school assign-
ments, thus perpetuating a dual system. The board continued to assign
children to schools according to their race. Under a Boiling conception of
individual right and governmental violation, the board was treating people
differently because of race, thus acting with constitutionally proscribed
intent. The educational right framed in Brown also was violated because the
government continued to pursue actions that could psychologically harm
minority students and impede their educational opportunity. The remedy,
simple and logical, was to require racially neutral and economically rational
school assignment of students, teachers, and staff.5 1 Yet the right pursued
and the relief imposed by the courts were not so limited. The district court,
Supp. 667 (W.D.N.C. 1965), aff d, 369 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1966), the Supreme Court
decided Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Litigants and the court
interpreted Green to require more relief than the district court had imposed. See infra
note 52. Plaintiffs reopened the case, which culminated with the Supreme Court
decision. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358
(W.D.N.C. 1969), aff'd, 431 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
49 Swann, 369 F.2d at 30.
10 The plaintiffs claimed that the school zoning process was undertaken with
segregative intent, and that the boundaries were racially gerrymandered to per-
petuate the segregated system. Swann, 243 F. Supp. at 668. They further challenged
that the board's failure to bring the remaining 10 black schools within the geograph-
ical zoning scheme and its teacher assignment practices were motivated by invidious
intent and perpetuated an unconstitutional dual system. Id.
sI Courts have presumed that racial "neutrality" requires an integrated assign-
ment of teachers. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S.
225, 232 (1969) (upholding district court's order that "in each school the ratio of white
to Negro faculty members [must be] substantially the same as it is throughout the
system"). Yet commentators have argued that a middle class white teacher cannot
effectively teach impoverished black children. See generally Edmunds, Effective
Education for Minority Pupils: Brown Confounded or Confused, in SHADES OF
BROWN 109 (D. Bell ed. 1980). Edmunds emphasizes the importance of a teacher's
support, rapport, and high expectations in promoting a student's educational suc-
cess. These characteristics are more likely to be manifested by a teacher whose
cultural background is similar to that of the student. Id. at 121.
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the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court, all participating in a doctrinal
revolution, held that the Constitution proscribed not only current invidious
intent to segregate, but also segregation that reflected the continuing effects of
past intentional discrimination.
5 2
This second order doctrine is unique in American constitutional law. In no
other area of equal protection has the Supreme Court deemed the continuing
effects of a past violation to be relevant in defining a contemporary violation
and framing a constitutionally required remedy.5 3 The Supreme Court, by
52 "The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of
state-imposed segregation." Swann, 402 U.S. at 15. The Court held that it was proper
for the district court to consider the effects of invidious policies that "promote[d]
segregated residential patterns" in fashioning a remedy. Id. at 21. A remedy might
require abandoning the concept of neighborhood zoning.
The notion that the Constitution proscribes the continuing effects of past segrega-
tion apparently originated with the affirmative remedial duty recognized in Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). See Swann, 402 U.S. at 7 ("The present
proceedings were initiated in September 1968 by petitioner Swann's motion for
further relief based on Green ... and its companion cases. All parties now agree that
in 1969 the system fell short of achieving the unitary school system that those cases
require.") (citation omitted).
This reading of Green's affirmative duty, however, far exceeded the limits of the
court's rationale in that case. The court simply held that when a locality transformed
its method of affirmative segregation from explicitly labelling schools as "black" or
"white," to covertly assigning individual students on the basis of race, even if the
students had the choice to opt out of their assignment, the locality had not fulfilled its
duty. An affirmative duty to cease contemporary intentional segregation in no way
implies an affirmative duty to eliminate the continuing effects of past intentional acts..
See infra note 71.
-1 Although second order language has been employed in some cases concerning
segregation in public housing, the Supreme Court has not defined a constitutional
violation and remedy in terms of the effects of past discrimination. In the litigation
that culminated with Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), for example, plain-
tiffs had challenged public housing locations chosen by the Chicago Housing Author-
ity (CHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) as
intentionally segregative. Plaintiffs had demonstrated a pattern of discriminatory
housing policy by a pattern of past practices. See Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 913 (N.D. 111. 1969). The Supreme Court stated that "[i]n
order to prohibit future violations and to remedy the effects of past unconstitutional
practices, the [district] court directed CHA to build its next 700 family units in
predominantly white areas of Chicago and thereafter to locate at least 75% of its new
family public housing in predominantly white areas inside Chicago or in Cook
County." 425 U.S. at 288.
The constitutional propriety of the district court's order against the CHA based on
the fourteenth amendment, however, was not at issue in the Supreme Court. 425
U.S. at 296 ("HUD does not ... question the appropriateness of a remedial order
designed to alleviate the effects of past segregative practices . . . . "). Rather, the
issue before the Supreme Court concerned the remedial obligation of HUD under the
[Vol. 63: 1
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
implication, confirmed the special status of the educational right in Washing-
ton v. Davis. 54 There, plaintiffs alleged that the personnel test employed by
the District of Columbia police force to screen job applicants violated the
requirements of equal protection because it disproportionately disqualified
black applicants. The Court distinguished between governmental action
motivated by discriminatory intent and neutral actions having a discrimina-
tory impact on disadvantaged minorities. After canvassing existing doctrine
in a number of areas,-" the Court held that the principles of equal protection
proscribe only actions motivated by invidious purpose.
5 6
In discussing the school desegregation cases, however, the Court im-
plicitly acknowledged that in the context of education, the Constitution
proscribes not only contemporary invidious intent, but a current offensive
condition caused by past invidiously motivated acts: "The school desegrega-
tion cases have also adhered to the basic equal protection principle that the
invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ulti-
mately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."5 s7 In the school
desegregation area alone, proof of past intent provides a sufficient predicate
of a governmental violation if such intent can be shown to have caused a
fifth amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Indeed, the Court later
indicated that the cause of action in Gautreaux was derived "directly from Title VI."
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 702-03 n.33. Second order
statutory principles, of course, are common. Thus, Gautreaux provides scant sup-
port for the proposition that the Constitution requires the elimination of the effects of
past discrimination in the realm of public housing. Cf. Schnapper, Perpetuation of
Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REv. 828 (1983) in which the author, seeking to
justify the argument that "the Constitution prohibits the causal connection of past
discrimination" in general, id. at 831, relied on cases predicated on the Constitution
only in the context of racial segregation in public education. In other contexts, the
Court had considered second order principles rooted in federal statutes. See, e.g.,
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1976) (Voting Rights Act of 1965); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (Voting Rights Act of 1965).
54 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
55 See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (requiring proof of legisla-
ture's invidious intent in drawing allegedly gerrymandered electoral districts); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (requiring proof of contemporary invidious
intent in discriminatory administration of a facially neutral statute); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (requiring proof of invidious intent for unconstitutional
discrimination in systematic exclusion of black jurors).
56 Such actions would include the contemporary administration of an invidiously
motivated statute or the contemporary invidious administration of a racially neutral
statute. Even the neutral administration of a statute passed long ago with discrimina-
tory intent constitutes contemporary invidious purpose. Each implementation of that
invidiously motivated democratic will constitutes a renewal of its proscribed pur-
pose.
57 Davis, 426 U.S. at 240 (emphasis added).
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current undesirable condition, even if current governmental policies are
undertaken without discriminatory intent.
Although the Supreme Court in Davis rejected the argument that the
principles of equal protection proscribe neutral governmental practices that
disproportionately disqualify minority applicants, it failed to consider
whether the second order right recognized in the educational context might
be more generally applicable. Would it have been appropriate for the Court
to have recognized a second order right proscribing the effects of past gov-
ernmental discrimination if the plaintiffs had alleged and proved that past
governmental violations in providing unequal educational opportunity
caused the disproportionate disqualification of black applicants to the Dis-
trict of Columbia police force? The District of Columbia had operated a dual
system until Boiling, and did not effectively dismantle that system until well
after 1954. The predicate harm postulated in Brown-unequal educational
opportunity created by a state-induced psychological sense of inferiority-
arguably had stigmatized those black applicants who had been educated in
the District. Their disproportionate disqualification by the District of Co-
lumbia's personnel test thus could be viewed as a continuing effect of past
governmental discrimination. In operating a police selection system without
discriminatory intent today, the state continued to disadvantage persons
whom it purposefully disadvantaged in the past.
But the harm at issue in Washington v. Davis can be distinguished from
the predicate harm in Brown and Swann. Davis was concerned with disad-
vantage in an application for employment. Brown and Swann defined educa-
tional rights. When the Court in Swann held that the government has an
affirmative duty to cure the lingering effects of past segregative acts, it meant
only those effects relevant to education. Disparate impact in employment,
58
even if an effect of past educational discrimination, is not a relevant effect,59
because it falls beyond the Court's core policy concern with education,
60
.58 For a consideration of the remedial implications of a right defined in terms of
pure discriminatory impact, see Perry, The Disproportionate Theory of Racial Dis-
crimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977). Perry envisioned a remedy that would
be circumscribed by considerations of "practicality." Courts would scrutinize gov-
ernmental actions to determine whether the state had struck an appropriate balance
between practicality and a group's right to be protected from discriminatory impact.
Perry emphasizes that governmental practices with a discriminatory impact should
be examined to determine whether the governmental decisionmakers properly con-
sidered the discriminatory impact in making their decisions. Id. at 558-61, 586-89.
Perry's version of an impact right thus relies more heavily on the Boiling branch of
equal protection than on the principles of Brown. Governmental decisions are test-
ed for the propriety of the decisionmaking process rather than for the substance of
what the state provides.
59 For a further discussion of the concept of relevancy, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 87-97.
60 The primary concern with education is certainly justifiable. One justification is
utilitarian. Education is fundamental in determining the status of groups and individ-
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B. Compromising the Second Order Right: An Intent "Trigger" 6 1 Toward
Third Order Deprivation
The second order right established by Swann rendered constitutionally
infirm segregation that could not be reached under Bolling's process-
oriented brand of equal protection. But even a doctrine that proscribes the
harmful educational effects of past intentional segregation reaches only so
far; a principled pursuit of a second order right would leave much segrega-
tion intact. The Supreme Court has not, however, pursued its purported
second order doctrine in a principled fashion.
Second order segregation, defined as the continuing demographic effects
uals in competitive endeavors. Equal education can make those competitive arenas
more efficient. If there are more well-qualified participants, all can be pushed toward
higher achievements. A program to compensate victims of disparate impact in em-
ployment, however, addresses social inequality far later in the process of producing
social wealth. It imposes social costs without creating the potential for greater social
production. For a discussion of principles for determining the extent to which
employment discrimination should be compensated, see infra note 151.
Another justification relates to the nature and purpose of the Constitution. The
Constitution establishes principles for a just society. One such principle seeks to
protect chronically disadvantaged groups from majoritarian tyranny. Ideals of equal
protection are thus concerned with the just status of groups in American political,
social, and economic strata. Education is fundamental, and can either ensure the
perpetual impoverished status of a group, or promote the group's integration
throughout the social structure. Issues of disparate impact in employment, however,
arise primarily because of more fundamental educational discrimination. A remedy
addressing the inability of disadvantaged minorities to compete for jobs might al-
leviate the suffering of individuals and families, but the alleviation of suffering will
have little effect in breaking down the causes of deprivation-the walls of social
caste. Thus, the educational right is appropriately a constitutional concern because it
responds to structural social flaws, and can remedy the causes of much social
inequity. A right proscribing disparate impact in employment is far more tenuously
related to eliminating the causes of social deprivation and to making the fundamental
structure of society more just, despite its importance to the individual victims of
employment discrimination. Such a right is appropriately statutory.
61 See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern
School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697, 705 (1971):
The existence of past discrimination [in Swann] was a term used as a 'trigger'-
and not for a pistol, but for a cannon. Such a role cannot be defended unless the
primary concern of the Court is the segregated patterns themselves, rather than
the causal relationship of past discrimination to them. The attention paid to past
discrimination can be viewed as an attempt by the Court to preserve the con-
tinuity with Brown and to add a moral quality to its decision.
Although Fiss appropriately noted the incongruity between the extent of past intent
proved and the extent of a locality's remedial obligation, he was incorrect in his
assertion that the vestigial requirement of past intent remains as a link to Brown.
Rather, any inquiry into intent reflects the continuing vitality of Boiling and its
process-oriented brand of equal protection analysis.
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of past intentional discrimination, implies a "but for" definition of right,
violation, and remedy. 6 2 This emphasis on causation constitutes the essen-
tial distinction between second and third order rights; only effects causally
linked to past invidious state acts are constitutionally prohibited by a second
order right, whereas all relevant aspects 63 of contemporary deprivation are
cognizable in a third order regime. This theoretically critical distinction has
been blurred in application. The Court has obfuscated the second order
doctrine with notions of the "systemwide violation" and the "affirmative
duty," requiring offending localities to achieve an ideal racial balance.
64 It
has thus created principles reaching toward the proscription of third order
segregation.
1. The Systemwide Violation
A systemwide violation, or "dual system" of education, may be found to
exist in the context of both northern and southern segregation. If a state or
locality had an explicit statutory policy of racial segregation in 1954, it has
presumptively committed a systemwide violation.65 In cases involving
northern segregation, a plaintiff can show a systemwide violation by proving
that a school board engaged in purposefully segregative actions "in a mean-
62 A strictly defined remedy for second order segregation would be concerned only
with that increment of present segregation caused by the past improper conduct of
government officials. This would require identifying the unconstitutional state action,
hypothesizing its effects, and estimating current reality "but for" such action.
63 For a consideration of the concept of " relevancy" see supra text accompanying
notes 58-59; infra text accompanying notes 87-97.
64 The "ideal" racial balance reflects racial proportions throughout the entire
system, See infra note 80.
65 See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973) ("[W]here
plaintiffs prove that a current condition of segregated schooling exists within a school
district where a dual system was compelled or authorized by statute at the time of our
decision in Brown I, the State automatically assumes an affirmative duty 'to effectu-
ate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system.' ") (quoting Brown I,
349 U.S. at 301) (citation omitted).
It should be noted, however, that the premises for inferring systemwide intent from
a permissive statute are far weaker than those supporting this inference from a
mandatory statute. A mandatory statute requires segregation, and thus creates a
segregrated system regardless of the underlying demographics of the area; such a
presumption cannot reasonably be made when segregation is merely tolerated. But,
the Court accords as much presumptive weight to the latter as to the former. This
paradox might be partially explained by noting that an explicitly permissive statute
could impose as much psychological harm on minority students as a statute requiring
segregation. Although explicitly mandatory and permissive statutes were significant
for Brown's values in the context of first order segregation, the relevance of their




ingful portion of a school system." 66 Such actions may include gerrymander-
ing attendance zones, implementing race-based school location policies, and
establishing mobile and temporary classrooms or optional attendance
zones .67
The finding of a systemwide violation creates a presumption that all
segregation at the time of the violation was the product of illegal acts, and
eliminates the need to prove that the government's invidious acts infected all
schools in the district.68 If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of a
66 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1972); see also Dayton Bd.
of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 535-37 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Dayton III;
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 456-58 (1978). But cf. Dayton Bd.
of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 407-08 (1977) (findings of intentional acts not
sufficiently substantial to warrant presumption of dual system) [hereinafter cited as
Dayton I].
67 See Dayton H, 443 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1978); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick,
443 U.S. 449, 461-62 (1978); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 191-93
(1972).
68 See Dayton H, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1978). The presumption of a dual system from
proof of invidious intent in a "meaningful portion" of a school district is not
predicated only on assumptions about the subjective psychology and motivation of
school boards. If a board acted invidiously in one part of town, it is not presumed to
have so acted in all parts of town. Rather, the effects of invidious intent in a
substantial portion of a district are presumed to have a segregative impact in all areas
of that district. Id. at 201-03. This presumption establishes as only secondary con-
siderations the possibilities that segregated neighborhoods might have pre-dated the
segregative actions in question, that the predominant proportion of current segrega-
tion might be unrelated to state action, and that the "but for" increment of segrega-
tion might be small. Furthermore, a presumption justified by a ripple effect theory
cannot escape the physical fact that a ripple loses its intensity as it travels farther
from its source. Proof of segregative intent in one part of town might justify finding
segregative effects within a reasonable buffer zone, but presuming more seems
irrational.
One might, however, seek to base a systemwide violation on the presumption that
if a northern board acted invidiously in a significant portion of a school district, it
would have done so in all parts if this were necessary to ensure a segregated system.
Similarly, if segregation were mandated by statute, a board would have foregone an
economically rational neighborhood policy in all integrated areas where affirmative
measures were necessary to achieve racial segregation. In the North, where there
were no explicit segregative statutes, a board that manifested a desire to segregate
could be presumed to have done so throughout the system if segregated neigh-
borhood patterns had not already existed.
But the presumptions supporting the systemwide violation in both southern and
northern circumstances implicate hypothetical "what if" intent. These presumptions
suggest that if reality had not been as it was and if community patterns were originally
integrated, the government would have despoiled the situation with tainting intent
throughout the district. But "what if" intent is inconsistent with a scheme predicated
on "but for" causation. In the context of a mandatory statute, a presumption of
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systemwide violation, the defendant school board may rebut this presump-
tion by establishing that the school district had been divided by geographical
or natural boundaries "into separate, identifiable, and unrelated units."
69
The circumstances under which a board could successfully rebut this pre-
sumption, however, are rare.
70
2. The Affirmative Duty
The legal fiction of a systemwide violation is most significant not because
it presumes a broader past violation than a plaintiff has proved, but because
it triggers an affirmative remedial duty circumscribing the discretion of
future governmental actors. Once a locality commits a systemwide violation,
it thereafter bears "the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch." 7' Under this affirmative obligation,
intent is not justified when community patterns already were segregated and affirma-
tive action played no role in effecting segregation. Finding a systemwide violation
simply because there once was a mandatory statute presumes intent where it never
existed. The "but for" concept is corrupted. Similarly, in a district that never
operated under a statutory mandate, presuming districtwide intent from proof of
discriminatory intent in a "meaningful portion" of the district suffers from the same
infirmity.,Cf. Mount Healthy School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)
(Invidious intent will not fatally taint a decision unless it was the "but for" cause of
the decision.).
69 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 203 (1972).
70 Id.
7 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). In Dayton H and
Columbus, the Court squarely tackled the issue of when the affirmative obligation
becomes effective and held that the affirmative duty binds officials from the moment
a dual system is created. A board's subsequent actions will be evaluated according to
this duty. Failure to meet these standards exposes a school board to judicial interven-
tion. See Dayton H, 443 U.S. 526, 537-38 (1979) ("Given intentionally segregated
schools in 1954, . . . the Board was thereafter under a continuing duty to eradicate
the effects of that system."); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458
(1979).
The notion of an "affirmative duty" was first enunciated in the context of first
order segregation. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). In
Green, a local school board had abandoned an explicit policy of mandatory segrega-
tion after Brown and purported to eliminate the dual system by adopting a "free
choice" transfer plan. Id. at 432-33. Starting point pupil assignments continued as
they had under the mandatory system, but students were given the choice of opting
out of their initial assignments. Id. at 433. Since there was no significant segregation of
community patterns, all continuing vestiges of school segregation resulted from
continuing affirmative state action. The board in Green essentially had transformed
itself from a "southern" segregator to a "northern" segregator.
There was, therefore, no second or third order segregation in New Kent County. A
shift from overt to covert discrimination surely did not discharge the board's affirma-
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the locality must eliminate not just present segregative practices, but "all
vestiges of state-imposed segregation.''72
The affirmative duty significantly expands the standard of a board's con-
stitutionally required conduct from mere neutrality to affirmative remedial
action. 7 3 This obligation must be discharged despite the fact that the school
board may now be acting with immaculate racial impartiality, and may, in
fact, have been acting impartially since Brown. Courts will evaluate actions
undertaken to discharge the affirmative duty in terms of their effects rather
than the school board's underlying intent. 74 If the board fails to adequately
discharge its duty, a court may find a continuing violation and will fashion an
appropriate remedy with its broad equitable powers.
75
The Supreme Court has not explicitly defined the extent of the state's
affirmative remedial obligation. 76 Nevertheless, the Court's analyses in
Dayton I1,77 Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 78 and Swann, 79 imply
tive duty to create a unitary system. At the very least, the board should have
terminated economically irrational pupil assignments with segregative effects. Adop-
tion of a neighborhood assignment scheme, given the demographics and location of
schools in the system, would have produced a system that was integrated in fact.
The implications of an affirmative remedial duty in the context of second and third
order segregation are significantly different.
72 Swann, 402 U.S. at 15; see also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200
(1972).
73 Dayton 11, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1978).
74 This was the clear message of Columbus and Dayton H. Although the respective
boards continued to perpetrate invidious acts after 1954, the Court indicated that
subsequent intent, whether invidious or benign, was irrelevant: "The measure of the
post-Brown conduct of a school board under an unsatisfied duty to liquidate a dual
system is the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in decreasing or increasing
the segregation caused by the dual system." Id.
71 Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
76 The duty might be framed in three different ways. First, a locality might be
required to take no action that would increase segregation. Under this view, particu-
lar school location decisions, for example, could not legitimately reinforce second
order segregation. Second, a locality might be required to choose the most integrative
alternative of all possible actions. Here, given two possible school locations, a board
would be compelled to choose the alternative with the greatest integrative effect.
This standard is problematic because the concept of "action" is imprecise. See infra
note 126. Third, a locality might be required to take all action necessary to reach
some optimally integrative end. None of these formulations bears any relationship to
the notion of second order segregation. All are forward-looking remedies triggered
from the moment a systemwide violation has been committed. Generally, the last is
more integrative than the second, and the second more than the first.
77 443 U.S. 526 (1978). In Dayton II, the Court combined the Keyes presumption,
inferring a past systemwide violation from purposeful discrimination in a substantial
part of that system, with the Swann requirement that current effects of past discrimi-
nation be eliminated. If a school board committed sufficient discriminatory acts to
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that once a locality commits a systemwide violation, it thereafter bears an
affirmative duty to take all actions necessary to achieve the goal of system-
wide racial balance. 80 All current segregation is presumed to derive from
past violations. 8' Because rebuttal of this presumption is so unlikely, 82 and
because the current condition of segregation is the only component of a
violation over which contemporary governmental actors have control, a
locality can safely insulate itself from judicial intervention only by eliminat-
constitute a systemwide violation sometime in the past, it was thereafter under an
affirmative duty to eliminate the effects of past discrimination. All contemporary
segregation is presumed to have been caused by past discrimination. Id. at 540-42.
78 443 U.S. 449 (1978). In Columbus, the Court similarly combined the Keyes
presumption with the second order principles of Swann, and presumed that all
contemporary manifestations of segregation were caused by past discriminatory acts
undertaken in a "substantial part of a school system." Id. at 467-68.
79 In Swann,. the district court rejected the board's plan as insufficiently integra-
tive; although the plan eliminated all affirmative acts of first order segregation, it left
too many segregated schools. 402 U.S. at 11. The government's affirmative duty was
triggered because the school board had operated under a statute mandating segrega-
tion. But although the Court framed a second order right, it made no attempt to tie the
scope of the remedial plans of either the board or the district court to the continuing
effects of this statute. By affirming the final remedial decree, the Supreme Court
endorsed an ideal of integration not strictly linked to past state acts. The fact that the
board's plan was deemed inadequate suggests that the board was required to do more
than just avoid actions with a segregative impact, or choose actions with the most
integrative impact. It must, in fact, create a system with an "ideal" or "systemwide"
racial balance. The affirmative obligation attaches prior to a judicial finding of a
violation, either as of 1954 if a locality operated under a mandatory statute, or as of
the time, after 1954, when the locality engaged in sufficiently purposeful acts to
constitute a systemwide violation. In Swann, however, judicial authority already had
been invoked and there had been a prior finding of a violation. Thus, the above
analysis presumes a congruity between a board's affirmative duty and the scope of
judicial remedial power once a violation has been found.
80 Swann's admonition that "[t]he constitutional command to desegregate schools
does not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial
composition of the school system as a whole," Swann, 402 U.S. at 24, does not
undermine this conclusion. In Swann, the district court employed "mathematical
ratios" as a "starting point in the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an
inflexible requirement." Id. at 25. A distinction has thus been made between a strict
numerical requirement and a systemwide "goal" that must be met absent satisfaction
of a board's "heavy burden" to show that its failure to achieve the systemwide
benchmark is justified by "important and legitimate ends." Dayton H, 443 U.S. at
538. See infra note 84.
8 1 Dayton H, 443 U.S. at 538 ("[Dlefendant had failed to come forward with
evidence to deny 'that the current racial composition of the school population reflects
the systemwide impact' of the Board's prior discriminatory conduct.").
82 See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 203 (1972); Dayton 1I, 443 U.S.
at 538; supra note 80.
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ing all current manifestations of segregation.8 3 Any board that once commit-
ted a systemwide violation is essentially obligated to create a system that is
integrated in fact.
84
Although the Court has explicitly adhered to the "but for" principle in
83 This view was confirmed in Dayton H when the Court stated that during the
period of affirmative duty, pupil assignment policies must not perpetuate or reestab-
lish the dual system. 443 U.S. at 538. Yet the affirmative duty's ideal is limited by
concessions to practicality. The Court in Dayton II noted that a board's failure to
take all necessary integrative actions may be justified if the board bears the "heavy
burden of showing that actions that increased or continued the effects of the dual
system serve important and legitimate ends." Id. In Swann, the Court placed a
similar limit on judicial remedial power, recognizing that the continued existence of
"one race schools" in a judicial decree or a board's remedial plan might be valid
depending on the variety of circumstances in the particular case. See Swann, 402
U.S. at 26-27, 27 n.10.
84 A narrower reading of the duty, requiring for example, that a school district
choose the most integrative alternative for all actions taken, would create several
doctrinal problems. First, because this duty is narrower than the scope of judicial
remedial discretion which permits a court to impose a regime of optimally integrative
goals throughout the system, see Swann, 402 U.S. at 25; supra note 79, restricting the
scope of a locality's duty would essentially establish a "good faith" defense. It is not
clear when such a duty would be completely discharged, because it envisions no
proper end-state or guidelines for termination. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976) (considering the termination of a judicially
created integrative remedy). See infra note 147. This conception of the duty, there-
fore, serves as a means of holding off judicial interventions, as long as the board does
its best to compensate for past wrongs. But the Court clearly stated in Dayton H that
the measure of whether the affirmative duty is being discharged should be the effec-
tiveness and not the intent of a locality's actions. 443 U.S. at 538. The notion of a
"good faith" defense is inconsistent with a standard of effectiveness.
Second, it is necessary to limit or define the notion of the "most integrative
alternative for all actions taken." Does "action" include "inaction"? If so, the most
integrative alternative is integration. It may be argued that "actions taken" should be
limited to decisions such as new school construction and teacher assignment. This
minimal conception is contradicted by Swann, which cited examples of more integra-
tive alternatives that the Board could have and implicitly should have taken:
The final board plan left ten schools 86% to 100% Negro and yet categorically
rejected the techniques of pairing and clustering as part of the desegregation
effort .... [T]he Charlotte board was under an obligation to exercise every
reasonable effort to remedy the violation, once it was identified, and the sug-
gested techniques are permissible remedial devices. Additionally, . . . the board
plan did not assign white students to any school unless the student population of
that school was at least 60% white. This was an arbitrary limitation negating
reasonable remedial steps. Swann, 402 U.S. at 24 n.8.
Thus, the board's failure to adopt more integrative alternatives subjected it to judicial
remedial discretion. It could have insulated itself from judicial intervention only by
assigning students according to a formula seeking systemwide racial balance. The
Court, therefore, has apparently imposed on offending localities a comprehensive
duty of taking all actions necessary t6ward an ideal integrative end.
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defining the theoretical scope of the underlying right, notions of causation
have been all but ignored in doctrine developed to administer the purported
second order right. Presuming a causal connection between current
segregation and past illegal acts based on a finding of a systemwide violation
is inconsistent with a right theoretically limited to curing the effects of past
invidious state action. These presumptions bypass the inquiry into "but for"
causation logically required by a second order doctrine. They deem constitu-
tionally infirm current segregation that might have developed independently
of intentional segregative acts. Past intent has served merely as a formalistic
"trigger ' 8 for third order remedial responsibility.
This lack of concern with causality, despite its theoretical importance in a
second order regime, suggests that other considerations have motivated the
Court in shaping the definition of a constitutional violation. Because "but
for" causation is difficult to prove, the Court might be seeking to safeguard
the underlying second order right with doctrinal overkill. The concepts of
systemwide violation and affirmative duty, creating remedial liability beyond
the probable extent of causal responsibility, certainly ensure that the gov-
ernment will not compound the effects of its past invidious acts. But such a
rationale for tacking third order administrative principles to a second order
right is unsatisfactory. If the courts seek to protect a narrow constitutional
right by prophylactically employing broader proof rules and remedial duties,
that underlying right may lose whatever integrity it once had as a legal
concept. When society, through its constitution, protects a putatively nar-
row right with broad mechanisms of enforcement, it is, perhaps, without
acknowledgement, seeking to protect broader values. If one shoots at horse-
flies with a shotgun, one just might be more concerned about killing horses
than flies.
V. FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF Brown: A THIRD ORDER RIGHT OF
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE
What values has the Court pursued in creating the constitutionally unique
second order right? What is the purpose of its concern with past gov-
ernmental intent? Why has it transgressed the rational limits of second order
doctrine with presumptions reaching toward third order deprivation? Is
contemporary doctrine normatively justifiable? Would an alternative con-
ceptualization of the constitutional right more appropriately resolve the
doctrinal tension created by the Brown/Boiling dichotomy?
A right is like a vector. It has both direction, or substantive orientation,
and magnitude. The substantive orientation of a right refers to the condition
that it seeks to preserve or prevent, the characteristic of the beneficiary to
which the right responds. The extent of a right refers to the conditions under
which the government will be held liable for preserving or correcting the
85 See supra note 61.
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beneficiary's relevant condition . 6 To extract the essential principles lurking
in doctrinal development since 1954, an analyst should distinguish between
the substantive orientations of the rights created by Brown and Boiling and
their extents.
In focusing on the continuing effects of past unconstitutional acts, and in
transcending the definitional limits of a second order principle with presump-
tions and affirmative remedial duties that reach toward third order segrega-
tion, doctrinal development since 1954 has been concerned almost exclu-
86 A distinction between a right's substantive orientation and its extent must be
made in the context of its underlying goals. For example, values underlying the
substantive purpose of a right may compete with the normative foundations of
doctrine defining the extent of liability. This is true whenever the Constitution
recognizes substantive values but defers to democratic discretion over a significant
range of substantive modes of implementation. If adherence to the democratic
process is of the highest priority, it is perhaps justifiable to limit the extent of
governmental liability, even when a condition is contrary to underlying substantive
goals. Under such a process orientation, if the "democratic" branches of govern-
ment choose not to address a condition, judicial intervention would not be legitimate.
Limitations on the extent of governmental liabilty may also be predicated on princi-
ples of fiscal conservatism. See infra note 92.
In the context of a first order right, the concepts of nature and extent are insepara-
ble. Protected groups have a right only to governmental process untainted by discrim-
inatory intent. Similarly, the government will be held responsible only for those
actions that it undertakes with discriminatory intent. See infra notes 88-89.
The substantive orientation of a right and its extent are also in some sense
inseparable in the third order context. Both the substance and extent of a third order
right-in which the government bears an affirmative remedial duty despite the ab-
sence of any past or present discriminatory intent-must be supported by a compel-
ling normative foundation. For example, under hypothetical circumstances in which
Congress had authorized neither welfare nor unemployment benefits for those with-
out jobs, and millions were starving and homeless, the Court might feel compelled to
"create" a constitutional right to a minimum standard of living for those who would
starve or freeze to death, but for governmental assistance. The moral force of a
principle that protects people from starving in a "civilized" society argues against
limiting governmental responsibility to those cases in which the government has in
some sense created, or can be held "responsible" for, the starving person's plight.
The substantive orientation of the right and its extent cannot be separated.
The distinction between substantive orientation and extent is most significant for
the second order right. A doctrine proscribing the effects of past discrimination must
be supported by normative principles that define which effects are relevant. These
principles relate to the substantive purpose of the right. Since the government is
obligated to rectify only those relevant circumstances caused by past discrimination,
a different normative premise must support this limitation on the extent of gov-
ernmental liability. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. The normative
soundness of a second order right depends on the compatibility of the principles
defining which effects are relevant with those principles limiting the remedial respon-
sibility to relevant conditions caused by past discrimination.
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sively with the issue of extent. The Court has failed to make a consistent
choice between two dichotomous theories of governmental responsibility.
Thus, Brown's concern with the substance of education and Bolling's doc-
trine of governmental process-oriented equal protection have interacted
uneasily since 1954. Values underlying the substantive orientations of these
rights must be identified before their appropriate extent can be considered.
Only by identifying underlying normative premises can the full vector be
properly plotted.
A. The Substantive Constitutional Relevance of Second and Third Order
Segregation: Theories and Values
The Bolling branch of equal protection is concerned with the legitimacy of
the democratic process. 87 It presumes the optimality of decisions made by
the so-called "democratic" institutions of American government. Judicial
intervention is appropriate only if democratic actors predicated their deci-
sions on constitutionally proscribed factors such as an intent to treat "dis-
crete and insular" minorities differently from the faceless majority. Thus,
the substantive orientation and extent of governmental liability under pre-
dominant equal protection doctrine, because they are both concerned not
with the substance of decisions but with the process by which decisions are
made, are supported by consistent normative precepts.
Although discriminatory intent in enacting a law or performing a gov-
ernmental function comprises the constitutional violation in first order doc-
trine,8 8 past intent causes a contemporary constitutionally offensive condi-
tion in a second order regime. But because the constitutionally proscribed
condition is merely one of the many "effects of past discrimination," a
second order doctrine is an empty concept without criteria for defining
relevant effects. Thus, criteria of relevancy must relate to substantive con-
stitutional values other than legislative intent and the purity of governmental
process-a concern such as educational opportunity.8 9
87 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (Stone, J.).
See generally J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-104 (1980) ("Policing the
Process of Representation: The Court as Referee").
88 See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 12, at 358-59 (The equal protection clause
"erects a constitutional barrier against legislative motives of hate, prejudice, ven-
geance, hostility, or, alternatively, of favoritism, and partiality .... When and if the
proscribed motives replace a concern for the public good as the 'purpose' of the law,
there is a violation of the equal protection prohibition against discriminatory legisla-
tion.").
89 Boiling and its ilk justify constitutional and judicial limitations on the discretion
of democratic bodies on the ground that the discretion to act does not include acting
with a proscribed intent. Underlying motivations can make otherwise legitimate
democratic decisions illegitimate. A second order doctrine is inconsistent with this
emphasis upon democratic process. Although local officials may be acting with
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Segregated housing patterns, for example, are direct effects of past inten-
tional segregation in public education. Nevertheless, these patterns-the
essence of second order segregation-have not been deemed a constitutional
evil and do not trigger an affirmative remedial duty to provide integrated
housing facilities. 90 Similarly, disadvantage in the employment market may
be an effect of past discrimination against minorities educated in segregated
systems, but such disadvantage is not constitutionally cognizable. 9' Rather,
the Court has remained concerned only with the impact of past governmen-
tal violations on education and has limited its definition of contemporary
violations to segregation in the classroom.
Although the proscription of second order segregation does not rest on the
theoretical premise of Bolling's equal protection analysis, 92 it need not
necessarily rest upon Brown's value of equal educational opportunity. The
Court could have viewed second and third order segregation as education-
ally harmful because children had no opportunity to learn with, and live
with, children of other ethnic backgrounds. The substantive orientation of
the educational right might have been to promote racial harmony. But the
Court has never justified doctrinal developments since 1954 on the value of
ethnic diversity in education. 93
legitimate intent to implement the democratic will, their actions will be restricted by
prior acts of former officials, who once represented a majority that no longer rules.
This compromises the principle of limited intrusion on the democratic process.
90 Intentional discrimination in providing public housing, of course, does implicate
housing segregation as a relevant decisional factor for determining whether the
government acted with discriminatory intent. Cf. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284
(1976) (considering HUD's remedial responsibility for housing segregation under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see supra note 53.
91 See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussion of Washington v.
Davis).
92 The intent component, therefore, which separates second and third order segre-
gation, plays no principled role in defining the substantive orientation of the educa-
tional right being pursued. It also plays no principled role in defining the extent of
governmental liability, as it did in Boiling. See supra note 86. At most, the intent
requirement serves as a cap of convenience which limits the extent of governmental
liability, perhaps reflecting a limited commitment to the underlying substantive
values. Because it relates to the extent of society's commitment rather than to an
independent normative principle defining appropriate conditions of group entitlement
or social responsibility, the second order intent limitation is vulnerable to attack on
the ground that it limits the attainability of powerful moral goals without being
supported by its own competing moral predicate.
For a discussion of the relationship between the intent trigger and the "state
action" component of traditional equal protection doctrine, see infra note 159.
93 Educational diversity has, however, been recognized as a legitimate goal of
considerable merit in other contexts. See University of Calif. Regents v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978) (separate opinion by Powell, J.) (consideration of race as
factor in achieving goal of educational diversity constitutionally legitimate in higher
education admissions process).
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The Court, rather, has continued to pursue the value of equal educational
opportunity on which Brown was predicated. It has deemed second and third
order segregation constitutionally relevant because of their impact on the
educational performance of minority students. This conclusion is strongly
supported by Milliken v. Bradley,94 in which the Supreme Court was con-
fronted with a school system encompassing a racial demography that made
"meaningfully" integrated schools impossible. 9 The Court had no choice
but to examine the constitutional relevance of second and third order segre-
gation in order to define principles for framing a constitutionally appropriate
alternative remedy. After invalidating a student assignment remedy that
included surrounding districts where no predicate of past discriminatory
intent had been found, the Court affirmed the remedy imposed by the district
court which not only integrated Detroit's schools to the maximum practica-
ble extent, but also mandated programs to address the substantive deficien-
cies in the education provided to the disadvantaged minority students. In
Milliken II, the Court noted that "[p]upil assignment alone does not automat-
ically remedy the impact of previous, unlawful educational isolation; the
consequences linger and can be dealt with only by independent mea-
sures." ' 96 The Court thus reaffirmed the substantive orientation of equal
protection in the realm of education. Fair process is not enough; untainted
democratic decisionmaking is inadequate. The Constitution requires equal
educational opportunity.
97
94 433 U.S. 267 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Milliken II].
95 As of 1974, the city of Detroit was 71.5 per cent black and 26.4 per cent white.
Id. at 271 n.3. In the first round of litigation, the Supreme Court overturned the
district court's interdistrict remedy on the ground that a predicate of liability had not
been established for the surrounding districts. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
744-45 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Milliken I]. The lower court had found that
meaningful integration would have been impossible if the remedy were limited to
Detroit. Id. at 732-33. On remand, the district court found that "educational compo-
nents" of a remedy addressing desegregation "are essential for a school district
undergoing desegregation" and are "needed to remedy effects of past segregation."
Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1118 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
96 Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 287-88.
97 Despite Milliken H, the presumed link between second and third order segrega-
tion and educational opportunity has never been as clearly established as the pre-
sumed link between the sense of inferiority engendered by intentional segregation
and a minority student's depressed educational performance. Perhaps entrenched in
its dogma that "separate educational facilities are inherently unequal," Brown, 347
U.S. at 495, the Court ignored the possibility that second and third order segregation
might be only marginally relevant to the depressed educational performance of




B. Opportunity, Performance, and Equality
Brown established a constitutional requirement of "equal educational
opportunity. ' 98 But when the Court stated that "[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal," 99 it referred to inequality in the context of
first order segregation, created because intentional segregation impedes the
ability of minority children to learn. 100 Because the Court has never
explicitly articulated the relationship between second or third order segrega-
tion and educational opportunity,'101 the concept of equal educational oppor-
tunity must be further explored.
What does it mean to say that one person has less opportunity to learn
than does another? If students W and B are of equal "intelligence"' ' 10 and
social background, but student W is provided with two books and student B
with only one, student B clearly has been given less opportunity to learn
than has student W. When both students finish their course of study, student
B will have learned less than student W; if each is tested on the information
contained in the two books, student W will perform in a superior fashion.
In Brown, however, unequal educational opportunity was not caused by a
disparity in the facilities and learning materials provided to blacks and
whites. In assuming equal tangible facilities, the Court determined that
unequal educational opportunity resulted from a condition in the disadvan-
taged student's mind-a sense of inferiority caused by intentional
segregation-that produced unequal educational performance. Thus, al-
though student B may have had two books, he or she might have been
motivated to read only one, or half of each. When given the same test as
student W, student B would, of course, perform less effectively.
In a contemporary educational system, second and third order segregation
98 "We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and
other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of
equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does." Brown, 347 U.S. at 493;
see also Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts,
78 HARv. L. REv. 564, 588-98 (1965) (arguing that Brown established a principle of
equal educational opportunity while other equal protection analysis examines the
"inherent arbitrariness" of racial classifications).
99 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
100 Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children .... [T]he policy of separating the races is
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of
inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanc-
tion of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental
development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits
they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
Id. at 494 (quoting district court's factual finding).
101 See supra note 97.
102 Equal "intelligence" in this context means that given the same stimuli, the
brains of both people would respond in an equally efficient manner.
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reflect a deeply rooted condition of social disadvantage. These forms of
segregation reflect underlying segregated communities. The demographic
segregation of minorities is symptomatic of ghettos. The linguistic dialects
and cultures' 0 3 of the impoverished residents are distinct from those of the
middle class mainstream, which devises the tests, defines the jobs, hires the
employees, and creates the real world hurdles for which education is the
primary preparation. 0 4 The criteria of achievement and distinction in eco-
nomically isolated minority cultures may well be unrelated to success in
public school curricula. Students may speak solely Spanish, Chinese, or
dialects such as "Black English," which would inhibit their progress in an
educational system tailored to the needs of middle class "Anglo" stu-
dents. 05 If a middle class white student and a ghettoized black student both
103 See generally Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POV-
ERTY 187 (D.P. Moynihan ed. 1969). The "culture of poverty," as I use the term, is
emphatically to be distinguished from an impoverished culture. I make no evaluation
of cultures, but merely note that members of a culture developed in a context of
poverty are necessarily placed at a disadvantage in a competitive system conducted
according to the rules and values of the middle class. See infra notes 104-05.
104 See Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 287 ("Children who have been thus educationally
and culturally set apart from the larger community will inevitably acquire habits of
speech, conduct, and attitudes reflecting their cultural isolation. They are likely to
acquire speech habits, for example, which vary from the environment in which they
must ultimately function and compete, if they are to enter and be a part of that
community.").
105 There is considerable theoretical and empirical support for the premise that
children brought up speaking non-' 'standard" dialects of English are severely disad-
vantaged if their reading instruction fails to account for their spoken language. See,
e.g., Gillet and Gentry, Bridges Between Nonstandard English and Standard English
with Extensions of Dictated Stories, in 36 THE READING TEACHER 360-64 (Jan. 1983)
("[C]hildren can make the connection between spoken and written language more
easily if the language written down matches the patterns of their speech .... );
Schorr, Recent Outstanding Books for Young Readers from Spanish-speaking Coun-
tries, in 36 THE READING TEACHER 206-09 (Nov. 1982) ("An increasing number of
empirical studies strongly suggest that the initial reading experience of Spanish-
dominant children should be in Spanish and that their Spanish and English reading
skills can improve concurrently with their increased knowledge of English .... ).
Indeed empirical studies that have failed to demonstrate a correspondence between
speaking Black English and learning to read have been severely criticized for simplis-
tic methodology. See Troutman and Falk, Speaking Black English and Reading-Is
There a Problem of Interference?, in 51 NEGRO EDUC. 123-33 (1982).
Minority educational performance can also be affected by the skills and attitudes of
teachers. Instructors who are familiar with the home culture of their students can
foster their educational development. Unskilled instructors can unwittingly crush the
incentive to learn. See, e.g., Shields, The Language of Poor Black Children and
Reading Performance, in 48 NEGRO EDUC. 196-208 (1979) ("Teachers should know
the parameters of [Black English] so that communication is assured where children
'switch' from forward to more casual styles when appropriate. Teachers also need to
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are provided with the same book, but that book is written in "standard"
English, the black student will suffer from unequal educational opportunity;
since the black student is unfamiliar with the dialect in which the book was
written, he or she will find it difficult to comprehend. When tested on the
subject matter of the book, the black student will not perform as well as the
white student. Thus, second and third order segregation do not impose
educational impediments because they render schools racially identifiable;
rather, second and third order segregation reflect the fundamentally isolated
social condition of the students who attend those schools. These forms of
segregation are symptomatic of other impediments to equal educational
opportunity.
The concept of "equal educational opportunity" has no independent
meaning; it does not specify which group attributes should be considered
"unfair impediments to opportunity" for which the government is reme-
dially responsible, and which should be considered just "tough luck."'' 0 6
Because society recognizes the equal innate abilities of all racial and ethnic
groups, the ultimate definition of equal educational opportunity envisions a
school system that will enable minority students to learn as effectively as do
whites. If an educational structure psychologically inhibits the motivation of
minority students because of their status in society, or fails to account for
cultural differences that impede their performance, the minority students
have less opportunity to learn than do those of the cultural mainstream. In
defining the parameters of equal educational opportunity, opportunity and
performance collapse into the same concept. Thus, if blacks perform worse
on tests because they have not learned the required curriculum as effectively
as have whites, the government arguably has not provided equal educational
opportunity.
examine their attitudes concerning [Black English] and the children who use it.").
Indeed, teacher attitude can be a major determinant of the success or failure of
minority students. See Washington, An Analysis of the Attitudes of White Prospec-
tive Teachers Toward the Inner-city Schools, in 46 NEGRO EDUC. 31-38 (1977)
(arguing that many white teachers "possess attitudes that impede the learning pro-
cess and academic achievement of the inner-city child"); supra note 51.
106 Indeed, in Plessy, the Court considered a theory of psychological impact on
minorities caused by intentional segregation and rejected it as legally insignificant:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race
with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it .... 'When the government ... has secured to each of its citizens equal
rights before the law, and equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it
has accomplished the end for which it is organized' . . . . Legislation is
powerless to eradicate racial instincts ....
163 U.S. at 551 (quoting People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 448 (1883)).
The Plessy Court refused to hold the government responsible for the psychological
impact of its actions or for any impediment to opportunity caused by that impact.
This position was rejected in Brown.
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In defining the right of minorities to be free from discrimination in educa-
tion, should equal educational opportunity mean equal educational perfor-
mance? Should the government be constitutionally obligated to fulfill this
ultimate definition of equal educational opportunity? Some, no doubt, would
cringe at this end-oriented definition of "opportunity," a concept that
seems to be concerned primarily with "fair process." A right that requires
equal group performance10 7 imposes an affirmative remedial duty of heroic
proportions' 0 8 by holding the state responsible for causes of educational
disadvantage that it did not directly create. Nevertheless, Brown can be
interpreted as requiring the government to remedy any characteristic of the
educational process that exacerbates, or fails to compensate for, those
aspects of a group's disadvantage that rendered the group's educational
performance inadequate. The state in Brown did not intend to engender a
sense of inferiority. It did not directly create the impoverished and stig-
matized social condition of minority students that was a prerequisite if
intentional segregation was to have an adverse psychological effect on
minorities and impede their educational opportunities. Thus, because a
segregated structure yielding unequal educational performance was constitu-
tionally illegitimate in Brown, any educational structure yielding unequal
educational performance is arguably illegitimate.
Furthermore, this pure remedial conceptualization of racial discrimination
in the realm of education is normatively compelling and appropriately con-
stitutional. The ultimate concern in defining the constitutional right against
discrimination in education should be to eliminate the caste-like quality of
race in America. 10 9 The Constitution establishes the framework for a just
107 "Equal performance" refers to performance in a broad range curriculum.
Because the right to equal educational performance ultimately should ensure the
integration of the American economic structure, a school system should provide
substantially similar curricula to "Anglo" and minority students so that members of
each group will be proficient at performing marketable skills. In defining substantial
similarity, however, a distinction can be made between fundamental skills and
secondary knowledge. Fundamental skills include reading, speech, and mathematics.
Secondary knowledge consists of learning gained through the employment of funda-
mental skills. If two students were equally proficient at reading, for example, one
might choose to study English literature and the other African history. If equally
proficient in mathematics, one might pursue physics, and the other accounting. A
right to educational performance should require equal performance in the fundamen-
tal curricular areas at a minimum, and could arguably extend to include comparable
secondary areas.
108 For a discussion of the principles defining the government's remedial duty, see
infra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
109 This conceptualization of the appropriate focus of constitutional rights in
education is hardly unique. Other commentators have framed the goal as that of
improving the educational performance of blacks. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 98, at
604 (educational opportunity can be evaluated, in part, by "scores on standardized
tests"). But cf. Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX. L.
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social structure. All groups should have the same opportunity to participate
in American society, and to compete for its many benefits and rewards.
Brown was a signal that the Constitution no longer would tolerate a dual
society. In predicating its holding on the principle that unequal educational
opportunity constituted the proscribed inequality, the Brown Court en-
visioned ideals that reach farther than integration just in the nation's
classrooms. The spirit of Brown compels the integration of the economic
structure of American society. The educational system should fully equip
minorities to compete-blacks must benefit from education equally with
whites-so that they will no longer be disproportionately denied the benefits
of living in American society.
Without significant reform of the education provided to disadvantaged
minorities, there will always be a Harlem, a Watts, and a Roxbury, from
which individuals rarely can escape. Race in America, like caste in India,
can pose insurmountable social, economic, and political barriers. The rele-
vant problem lies not in the perpetual existence of an underclass, but in the
perpetually disproportionate correspondence between race and membership
in that underclass. Ours is a society concerned more about racial disadvan-
tage than about deprivation randomly distributed throughout the population.
The fourteenth amendment's special prohibition against racial discrimina-
tion and the Court's expansion of this right in the realm of education reflects
this value preference.
It is entirely appropriate for the Constitution to impose such a broad
affirmative duty in the context of the right against racial discrimination in
REv. 411, 499 (1973) ("The courts should not attempt to address the inequalities in
academic performance between socio-economic and racial groups; they should re-
spond where racial inequality and unequal access to school resources is demon-
strated."). Yudof thus seems to advocate a return to Plessy's concern with equality
in tangible resources rather than Brown's concern with educational performance.
Fiss predicates his philosophy on the special deprivation of historically depressed
groups in American society. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5
PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 107, 147-52 (1976). Underlying Yudof's concern with segrega-
tion is his view of a just social structure in which the economic status and demog-
raphic distribution of racial and ethnic groups in American society are not affected by
"white hostility." See Yudof, Nondiscrimination and Beyond, in SCHOOL DESEGRE-
GATION 108 (W. Stephan & J. Feagin eds. 1980) ("Integration is part and parcel of
the undoing of a caste system that consistently, over long periods of time, has
disadvantaged Black Americans.").
Nevertheless, these commentators have not carried their views to the logical
conclusion. Mere improvement of educational performance will not necessarily
catalyze the demise of racial caste. Relative deprivation will remain if improved
performance does not become equal performance. See infra notes 127-35 and accom-
panying text. Similarly, integration alone, even if it promotes racial harmony, is
hardly sufficient to eliminate systemic racial disadvantage. The mitigation of white
hostility addresses only first order deprivation. It will not eliminate the deeply-rooted
economic disadvantage that characterizes the caste-like status of race in America.
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education." I 0 As the root of achievement, education serves as the means by
which a person acquires the skills rewarded in society. Only a right of equal
educational performance can ensure the elimination of racial deprivation,
and can guarantee that societal disadvantage, if it is to exist at all, will be
spread evenly among all racial groups. "' If the Constitution does not impose
an affirmative duty on the government to ensure that the educational system
does not perpetuate pervasive social disadvantage, it deems caste to be
acceptable in the American social structure. 1 2
C. Ending the Tyranny of Past Intent
If the substantive orientation of the constitutional right is concerned with
equal educational performance, is a second order limitation on the extent of
governmental liability normatively justifiable? The intent limitation bears no
relation to the normative premises of either Brown " I3 or Boiling. 1 4 What
positive function does the intent limitation serve? Do its benefits outweigh
I o See supra note 60.
"' This is, to be sure, a broad notion of right, but it is not an unprecedented
characterization of a governmental affirmative duty. Even after Washington v. Davis,
scholars continued to advocate a general definition of equal protection based upon
discriminatory impact rather than discriminatory intent. See generally Perry, supra
note 58. A right of equal educational opportunity might be viewed as a right against
discriminatory impact limited to the realm of education.
112 A performance-oriented interpretation of the right against racial discrimination
in public education is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-37 (1973), in which the Court
rejected the argument that education is a "fundamental right." In Rodriguez, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a system that funded public schools by taxinR
property wealth within each district, and thus provided children in property poor
districts with fewer resources to support their education than those in property rich
districts. In rejecting this challenge, the Court considered only the constitutionality
of discrimination on the basis of residence in a property poor district. Racial dis-
crimination was not the issue:
[A]ppellees' suit asks this Court to extend its most exacting scrutiny to review a
system that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and amorphous
class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts that happen to
have less taxable wealth than other districts. The system of alleged discrimina-
tion and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness:
the class is not saddled with such disabilities ... or relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process.
Id. at 28 (citation omitted). The Court noted that "in the context of racial discrimina-
tion," Brown had recognized " 'education as perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments.' " Id. at 29 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
"3 See supra notes 86, 92 & text accompanying notes 43-45.
"14 See supra notes 89, 92.
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the negative impact that the intent requirement has on achieving Brown's
constitutionally rooted educational goals?
Predicating the remedial obligation on past illegal government action does
not preserve democratic discretion in a principled fashion, even though the
conditions of judicial intervention are limited.'" The second order intent
requirement simply serves as a practical limitation on the extent of the
government's remedial responsibility to pursue substantive goals. It may
thus be viewed as a speed limit on a highway which must be obeyed despite
the urgency of reaching a destination. As there are sound safety reasons that
justify a speed limit on a highway, so are there, generally, sound fiscal
reasons for adhering to a doctrine that limits a result-oriented affirmative
duty. Since the government has limited resources, it cannot be responsible
for curing all social ills at once.
But although a speed limit imposes an optimal compromise between the
competing goals of getting from here to there, and protecting the lives of all
travellers on the road, the intent requirement serves a relatively narrow
function in the context of a right against racial discrimination in education.
The issue is not whether the Court should adopt a right against "discrimina-
tory impact" in all constitutional contexts. That position was considered and
rejected in Washington v. Davis, 16 in which the Court recited the parade of
horribles that would ensue if the government were held responsible for the
unintended discriminatory impact of all laws. 7 An educational right, how-
ever, is especially important and manageably narrow. Moreover, the intent
requirement, unrelated to the substantive goals of that right, has pernicious
consequences that undercut the very possibility of achieving that goal. The
second order intent requirement not only ensures that the goal of equal
educational performance will be more slowly reached, it ensures that it can
never be reached.
The remedial limitations of second order doctrine are nowhere more
evident than in the cases of Milliken I18 and Milliken 1. 119 Because the
11 See id.
116 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
"7 The Court stated that
[a] rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid,
absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more
than another, would be far reaching and would raise serious questions about, and
perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and
licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average
black than to the more affluent white.
Id. at 248 (citation omitted). But cf. Perry, supra note 58 (disputing the Court's
presumption that laws having a disparate impact must be supported by a compelling
justification). Professor Perry argues that courts should scrutinize laws having a
disparate impact for more than mere rationality, but for less than compelling
necessity. Id. at 586-87; see infra note 152.
118 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
119 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
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district court determined that the Detroit school system did not have enough
white students to create an educationally meaningful remedial racial bal-
ance, 120 it imposed a student assignment remedy extending beyond the
boundaries of Detroit. The court thus took jurisdiction over students in
school districts where the predicate of discriminatory intent had not been
proven. The Supreme Court, however, refused to permit the lower court to
extend the Keyes presumption beyond district lines. 12 1 Although proof of
discriminatory intent in a "significant portion" of a school district would
support a presumption that school assignments throughout the system were
similarly tainted, surrounding districts could not be included in a remedial
decree without a particularized showing that invidious acts within one dis-
trict produced "a significant segregative effect in another district." 12 2 Thus,
in the context of defining past discriminatory intent sufficient to trigger a
broad remedial obligation, the school district boundary has devastating
implications for the rights of educationally disadvantaged students. 123
120 During the relevant period, the student population of Detroit was over 71.5%
black and 26.4% white. Id. at 271 n.3.
121 See Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744-47. In Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189
(1973), in which discriminatory intent motivated governmental actions in a "substan-
tial portion of a district," the Court upheld the lower court's presumption that all
segregation within the system was a consequence of those intentional acts. Citing
values of local control in Milliken I, the Court determined that the segregative effects
of such illegal acts should not be presumed to travel beyond the district boundary. Id.
at 741-42.
122 Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 744-45. The Court's holding that a locality in which no
predicate of past intent had been proven could nevertheless be included in an
interdistrict remedy if it suffered from the effects of action taken by officials in an
adjacent district is, indeed, curious. Why should the fact that the intentional acts of
officials in a neighboring locality had an impact on the demography of an "innocent"
locality circumscribe the latter's democratic discretion? How can this principle be
reconciled with the value of local democratic discretion? The Court did not establish
principles supported by clear normative precepts defining the amenability of such
"innocent" districts to judicial intervention.
123 The Court's treatment of local governmental entities has been criticized as an
unsupportable formalism. See Lee, The Federal Courts and the Status of Munici-
palities: A Conceptual Challenge, 62 B.U.L. REV. 1, 57-73 (1982). Because munici-
palities have no constitutional status independent of the states, and thus can create
no greater barrier to federal courts' remedial powers, id. at 61, the source of the
Court's deference to their autonomy is unclear. This is particularly anomalous in the
context of Milliken 1, in which the state was found to have violated the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 58. Lee therefore concludes that the Court's focus on district
boundaries in Milliken I was mere "artifice." Id. at 73.
Lee further argues that if the Court had not treated municipalities in such a
formulaic manner, it would have been forced "to define, unambiguously, the con-
tours of a violation of equal protection, the harm caused by the violation, the terms in
which it could be measured, and the remedy." Id. This conclusion is not quite
accurate, for it confuses the substantive orientation of a right with its extent. It is
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The Court's ruling left Detroit and other similarly situated school districts
without options for meaningful integration. If racial imbalance alone caused
the educational deprivation, the children of Detroit would have been left
without any constitutional remedy. Since racial imbalance is only one ele-
ment of educational disadvantage, however, the court was able to impose a
remedy that addressed the quality of education provided to the students of
Detroit.124
It is unlikely, however, that an overwhelmingly black and poor school
district, without enough white families to achieve "meaningful" integration,
would have sufficient financial resources to fund a constitutionally mandated
program. In Milliken II, the Court required the state to pay for half the cost
of all remedial programs. 125 But what recourse would the children of Detroit
have had if the state had not been held responsible? The local taxpayers
would have been forced to fund their own remedy, a remedy necessitated by
the past illegal acts of their public servants. Even if it were just to make the
victims pay for their remedy, they would have been financially unable to do
SO.
The essential contradiction of this scenario is clear. Even if a locality
acted with past invidious intent and is therefore subject to the second order
remedial duty, and even if it acted so egregiously that its past unconstitu-
tional acts have yielded a school district that is overwhelmingly black and
poor, that locality will not have the necessary resources to achieve either
an adequate integrative remedy or an adequate educational remedy. The
locality that has been guilty of the worst constitutional violation will be
unable to effect a remedy; the state or federal government, although able to
fund a remedy, is not obligated to provide one. The Court thus has created a
constitutional doctrine that pursues values implicating the very essence of
the American social structure. But when confronted with the most severe
instances of deprivation, the second order doctrine precludes the constitu-
tionally necessary remedy.
126
precisely because the Court elevated the status of municipal boundaries in Milliken I,
thus rendering a satisfactory integrative remedy unattainable, that it was forced to
confront in Milliken 1H the issues that Lee enumerates. It would be more accurate
to say that a formulaic treatment of district lines precludes a more probing and
rational analysis of the extent of state liability. What is the significance of discrimina-
tory intent, of local democratic entities, and why should we hold one governmental
entity or another responsible under particular circumstances?
124 The Court required the school district to improve facilities and provide reme-
dial educational programs. Milliken H, 433 U.S. at 287.
125 Id.
126 A first order doctrine could conceivably reach second and third order segrega-
tion, but only under circumstances so elusive that the remedial value will be negligi-
ble. Could invidious intent be proven if the school district created a maximally
integrative neighborhood system, but did no more?
Current discriminatory intent in the operation of such a school system could be
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Because the moral imperative of remedial ideals is most compelling in the
context of racial discrimination in the realm of education, the Court has
implicitly recognized the inappropriateness of the intent limitation. Intent
played no doctrinal role in Brown. Although central in the traditional doc-
trine reflected in Boiling, invidious governmental intent is only tenuously
linked to the second order right. This link was snapped altogether when the
Court created the notion of the "systemwide violation" and imposed a broad
remedial duty when such violations were found. The Court's actions suggest
that the intent requirement is a nuisance to be averted rather than a doctrine
meriting principled adherance. The time has come to recognize that the
intent requirement has no positive role to play toward effecting the ideals of
Brown. For a vector representing the educational right, substantive orienta-
tion is meaningful only when extent is unbounded.
VI. CONTOURS OF A REMEDY FOR Brown's THIRD ORDER RIGHT OF
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL PERFORMANCE
A. Equal Educational Performance and Third Order Segregation: Is There
A Rational Connection?
Educational deprivation has been conceived in terms of segregation since
Brown and Boiling. Although courts and commentators have presumed that
segregation impedes the educational performance of minority students, the
established if the following elements were proven: first, that the school officials
knew that minority students would in some way be harmed by attending schools
reflecting segregated community patterns, and second, that these officials operated
the school system not in spite of this knowledge, but because of it. Cf. Personnel
Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979) (upholding Mas-
sachusetts' preference to veterans for state civil service positions despite the dis-
proportionate impact).
Proving current invidious intent in the operation of a neighborhood school system
will almost always be impossible. The state of sociological knowledge about educa-
tional harm is far too unsettled to serve as the predicate for a finding that the board
necessarily believed its actions would harm minority children. Furthermore, even
assuming some knowledge or belief of such harm, it seems unlikely that school
officials would operate a neighborhood system because of this harm, rather than in
spite of it. Cf. id. at 278-80. There are, after all, sound reasons of economic efficiency
for operating a community school system. See Mount Healthy School Dist. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (invidious intent will not fatally taint a decision
unless a "but for" cause of the challenged action).
It also should be noted that the educational harm envisioned in this theory of
current invidious intent is, of course, not the same educational harm envisioned in
Brown. Discriminatory intent in Brown was the predicate, the cause of educational
harm. But under a first order right that proscribes only current discriminatory intent
in operating a neighborhood school system, the educational harm serves as the
predicate for finding intent. Government officials must be charged with the specific
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root of this harm has never been specified. 12 7 Despite the fact that the Court
has abandoned the requirement of contemporary purposeful segregation in
the context of second and third order deprivation, and has postulated no
alternative to the theory of psychological harm, separation still serves as the
criterion for identifying unconstitutional discrimination.
Integration alone could cure the performance gap between blacks and
whites only if segregation were the sole cause of unequal educational per-
formance. Although third order segregation may contribute to educational
harm, 1 28 it clearly does not define the nature and extent of that harm.
Educational disadvantage stems primarily from the impoverished status of
minority groups in society. Isolated from the culture of the "Anglo"
mainstream, 129 minorities are saddled with starting point disadvantages in
the educational process.' 3 0 This lack of knowledge of the culture of pow-
intent to harm minority students because they believed those students would be
educationally disadvantaged in neighborhood schools reflecting segregated commu-
nity patterns and chose the neighborhood system precisely because of that harm. The
harm caused by segregated community patterns would have to exist independently of
current invidious intent. It must thus exist inherently in the social situation of
ghettoized minorities. See infra notes 127-135 and accompanying text.
127 Even in Milliken II, in which the Court explicitly established the link between
the educational right and educational performance, the causal connection between
second and third order segregation and educational disadvantage was not identified.
The premise that second and third order segregation impede minority performance
has remained unsupported by a strong theoretical foundation. Empirical study of the
educational impact of busing remains the only significant attempt to examine that
presumed relationship. See, e.g., N. ST. JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: OUT-
COMES FOR CHILDREN 16-41 (1975) (considering studies measuring the effect of
desegregation on academic achievement). St. John concludes that desegregation is a
complex phenomenon without a clearly identifiable or explainable impact on educa-
tional performance. Id. at xi.
128 Third order segregation might simply be a symptom of the source of the
depressed educational performance of minority children-such as "cultural isola-
tion." Whether segregation itself causes any educational harm remains the subject of
a raging empirical debate. See, e.g., N. ST. JOHN, supra note 127, at 36 (The "causal
relation between school racial composition and academic achievement" has not been
empirically demonstrated. "More than a decade of considerable research efforts has
produced no definitive positive findings.").
129 See supra notes 103-105.
130 This theory of educational deprivation has served as the predicate for remedial
action when educational rights have been guaranteed by federal statute. In Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), for example, the Court considered § 601 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), and its applicability to an educational
curriculum geared toward middle-class "Anglo" students. The Supreme Court held
that § 601 requires that non-English speaking children receive some instruction in
their native language. 414 U.S. at 565-66. The Court reasoned that "there is no
equality of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities,
textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand English are
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er131 precludes minority children from benefitting as fully as white children
from a curriculum geared toward the white majority.132 Even if integration
can promote an improvement in minority performance, it cannot fully com-
pensate for starting point disadvantage. Busing alone cannot yield equal
performance, even in a thousand years. Relative disadvantage will re-
main. 
133
effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education." Id. at 566. The Court viewed
the Chinese students' unfamiliarity with English as an impediment "which denies
them a meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program." Id. at 568.
Although language difficulties provide the most obvious, and perhaps the most
significant, barrier to equal educational performance, other cultural variations may
impede minority adaptation to a curriculum designed by and for members of the
"Anglo" culture. Such variations might include different values regarding academic
achievement as well as a general disinterest in European history and culture. The
principles underlying the Lau decision could conceivably be extended to require that
educational opportunity not be impeded by these other cultural variances.
The analogy between the constitutional right of equal educational performance and
the educational rights framed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d is appropriate in this context. The
statute has been interpreted as imposing an affirmative duty on recipients of federal
funding to ensure that non-English speaking minority students do not "receive fewer
benefits than the English-speaking majority" from a public educational system. Id.
Thus, although the legal predicate of educational rights under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d is
different from that underlying the constitutional right developed in this Article, the
substantive orientations of both rights are compatible.
13 The notion of cultural isolation must be distinguished from any suggestion of
cultural deprivation, which would imply that black or Hispanic ghetto culture is in
some way deficient when compared with middle class "Anglo" culture.
32 See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) ("[T]he Chinese-speaking minor-
ity receive fewer benefits than the English-speaking majority from respondents'
school system .. .[because] the 'inability to speak and understand the English
language excludes national origin-minority group children from effective participa-
tion in the educational program offered by a school district .......") (quoting 35 Fed.
Reg. 11,595 (1970)); see also Comments of the Puerto Rican Defense & Education
Fund, Inc., in Consultations on the Affirmative Action Statement of the U.S. Com-
mission on Civil Rights, Vol. I, at 17-18 (Papers Presented on February 10 and March
10-11, 1981, Washington, D.C.):
The purpose ... of bilingual education is to integrate students into the educa-
tional system and to provide them with the same opportunity to learn, advance,
and become functioning citizens of this Nation as is afforded those who have the
advantage of having English proficiency. Not to address the linguistic/cultural
needs of these students would be to put them at a social and legal disadvantage.
In considering the issue of bilingual education, however, a distinction should be
made between assimilation into the educational system and assimilation into the
predominant culture. Whereas the former is necessary for full access to social power
and economic benefits, the latter may not be. Bilingual education poses significant
questions about cultural integrity and individual autonomy. See infra Section VI E.
131 It may seem paradoxical that black students, educated in the same classrooms
with white students, can be said to receive an unequal education. This presumes,
however, that to treat people identically is to treat them "equally." Giving a starving
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As long as disadvantaged minority students perform at a lower average
level of achievement than do whites, the government has failed to fulfill its
affirmative remedial obligation. A successful remedy, therefore, must focus
on performance. It must address those components of a curriculum that can
compensate for the effects of cultural isolation and provide minority stu-
dents with the skills necessary to compete in the American meritocracy.
13 4
Integration may be relevant, but only to a limited extent. 35 Far more
significant is the substance and method of educational instruction. Since the
deprivation is substantive, so must be the remedy.
B. Equal Educational Performance: Defining a Violation
In order to define a breach of the educational right, the following two
questions must be addressed. First, what characteristics determine whether
a group is entitled to remedial education? And second, against what "control
group" should educational performance be compared?
1. The Victim Class
The fourteenth amendment is especially concerned with the social and
political disadvantage of "discrete and insular" minorities. Its group orienta-
tion suggests a concern with the macrostructure of society, based not
primarily on the existence of an underclass, but on the disproportionate
membership of disadvantaged minorities in that underclass. The demo-
graphic isolation of socially disadvantaged minority populations is an inevita-
ble symptom of the caste-like quality of race in America. Segregated neigh-
borhoods are almost uniformly ghettos, where poverty, unemployment, and
illiteracy are passed from generation to generation. It is these conditions
which the right of equal educational performance is intended to redress.
The right, therefore, should protect any discrete neighborhood'3 6 of disad-
man and a fat man each a piece of bread will not result in "equal" treatment if there is
an affirmative duty to ensure that each lives a healthy life. Similarly, identical
treatment may be inappropriate if a right requires equal performance. For a discus-
sion of the ambiguities in the concept of equality, see Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1982) (Equality is a concept of little value,
wholly dependent on independent substantive choices.). The concept of equality
becomes meaningful only in the context of defined relevant circumstances-are the
men receiving the piece of bread in the above hypothetical similarly situated, or is
one starving and one fat? The selection of the relevant circumstance reflects an
underlying normative choice. The educational right thus should not be viewed in
terms of the obfuscating notion of equality, but in terms of its underlying substantive
goals and values.
134 See supra note 107.
13- Thus, busing might be part of a constitutionally required remedy, but only as
one element addressing the secondary causes of unequal educational performance.
136 Should the children of a poor black family in Montana, who do not live in a
ghetto with a significant number of other minority families, be included as members
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vantaged minority students whose culture, language, and impoverished so-
cial status 137 have rendered the typical middle class "Anglo" educational
program unresponsive to their educational needs.1 38 The right is breached
of the constitutionally entitled class? A justification for their remedial entitlement
would be somewhat different from that underlying the right as applied to disadvan-
taged groups. A normative principle envisioning the just achievement of all individ-
uals but for the effects of cultural isolation could exist independently of any consid-
eration of race. Cf. Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1150, 1153
(10th Cir. 1974) (disadvantaging effects on one student can preclude meaningful
education). But see Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 572 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (substantial numbers of children must be affected to find violation). Why should
a poor black individual be compensated for the effects of his poverty and cultural
isolation but not a poor white individual? An argument might be made that the black
individual's plight, in all likelihood, is an effect of past racial discrimination, and that
society should be obligated to compensate for this particular cause of disadvantage.
This justification, however, is backward looking as it focuses on the perpetrator's
blameworthiness. A concern with disadvantaged individuals who do not reside in
racially identifiable neighborhoods ignores the central role of segregation in per-
petuating the caste-like condition of race in America. In a third order regime, past
blameworthiness is irrelevant. The unacceptability of racial caste remains the critical
principle.
A disadvantaged minority student who does not reside in a segregated ghetto has,
in a significant sense, escaped from a critical condition characterizing racial caste.
The plight of this student may in some sense be important, but its constitutional
relevance is limited given the third order right's concern with the self-perpetuating
characteristics of racial caste-cultural isolation, inferior education, and poverty-
which are most severe and systemic in minority ghettos. See supra note 60 (discus-
sion of educational right versus employment right).
137 Should a group of poor and unskilled Haitian refugees entering the United
States in 1983 be ensured equal educational opportunity by the Constitution? If the
right were predicated on a remedial obligation triggered by past discrimination by the
government or by society in general, the Haitians' remedial entitlement could not be
justified. If, however, the edu. :t.nal right were predicated on the ideal of a multicul-
tural society in which there is no correspondence between race and socio-economic
status, then the remedial entitlement might be justifiable. Without appropriate educa-
tion, the plight of a group of Haitian refugees may well become that of the perpetually
impoverished black or Hispanic. Whether in black Harlem or Haitian Harlem, the
constitutional issue concerns the impropriety of racial caste in a multicultural soci-
ety and the disproportionate correlation between ethnicity and economics. The
entitlement of a new minority group would be predicated on a prophylactic concern
with the potential development of additional disadvantaged castes in America.
13s A definition of remedial entitlement that requires residence in a segregated
community might create incentives promoting the perpetuation, and perhaps even
the augmentation, of segregated housing patterns among the disadvantaged. Al-
though this result may be superficially similar to the role that first order segregation
plays in promoting second order segregation, see supra notes 19-21 and accompany-
ing text, the potential increase in segregation is not unambiguously undesirable.
A minority family's decision to remain in a segregated neighborhood because of
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whenever such a demographically isolated population of minority students
performs substantially below the relevant average white student popula-
tion 139 in significant areas of education. 140
2. Unequal Performance Compared to Whom?
Since a special concern with the educational disadvantage of minorities is
based upon the goal of destroying the correspondence between race and
class, the educational right requires that the average performance of blacks
and the average performance of whites be equalized. Several different
benchmarks will arguably achieve this goal. Each has different implications
for the constitutionally required performance level of local minority popula-
tions.
An obvious potential benchmark would be the national average white
performance. Because it is a national average, however, this benchmark
would produce anomalous results. If the average white performance in a
particular locality exceeded the national average, the constitutional rights of
the victim class would be satisfied despite the fact that local black perfor-
mance continued to trail the average white performance. Conversely, if the
average white performance in a particular region were lower than the na-
tional average, the local black population there would, by virtue of the
constitutionally required remedy, be entitled to perform at a higher level
than local whites. Thus, since the academic performance of southern whites
trails the national average, southern blacks would eventually perform at a
higher level than southern whites. More significantly, however, blacks
would remain educationally disadvantaged in the north, and in other areas
educational incentives generated by the constitutional right of equal educational
performance will be a positive choice, predicated on a positive benefit. Unlike the
incentives of first order segregation, in which minority families were encouraged to
cluster around schools because of economic reality more than positive choice, the
incentive to cluster in a neighborhood in order to receive a culturally appropriate
educational program reflects a desire to obtain an effective education. Although these
incentives may, in fact, discourage the immediate devolution of segregated demo-
graphic patterns, those discouraged from relocating will be precisely those whose
children need the appropriately tailored education, if integration is to be socially
significant. A family that locates in a segregated neighborhood to obtain needed
compensatory education for its children might otherwise have moved to an integrated
neighborhood, but that neighborhood would probably have been an ethnically di-
verse slum.
Even if the right encourages families to live in segregated neighborhoods, this
incentive should only be temporary. Those educated in culturally appropriate schools
will be able to compete in the arenas of society at large, to gain economic rewards,
and as a result to escape from disadvantaged segregated neighborhoods to areas of
higher social and economic strata.
139 See infra Section VI B.2. (defining relevant average white student population).
140 See supra note 107.
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where white performance exceeded the national average. A benchmark
imposing a national standard of required minority performance is thus unde-
sirable; it would preserve the foundations of racial caste in significant por-
tions of the nation.
Local disparity could be averted, however, if the required performance
level for minorities were measured by the average white performance in each
locality. A local benchmark would be entirely consistent with the normative
underpinnings of the third order right. Local fluctuations in white perfor-
mance are not generally attributable to a long history of discrimination or to
cultural isolation. The difference between minority performance and white
performance in each local region will reflect the degree of educational
deprivation attributable to a minority group's cultural isolation.
C. The Alternative Remedy: Tailoring Education to the
Needs of the Victim
An appropriate remedy for eliminating inequality in minority educational
performance must serve two educational goals. The first is remedial-it must
compensate for the effects of cultural isolation by equalizing the educational
receptivity of black and white students. The second is developmental-it
must teach minorities those skills necessary to compete in the achievement
arenas of American society.
In achieving these goals, the governmental body responsible for discharg-
ing the remedial obligation' 4' must consider the special conditions of the
community whose rights have been violated. What is the nature of the
community's cultural isolation? What is the source of its students' depressed
educational performance? Language, the cultural criteria of status and
achievement, and other ethno-cultural factors, all may contribute to the
inadequacy of an education oriented toward the middle-class "Anglo"
student. The cause of educational deprivation in one community may not be
identical to that in another. Remedial education for a black community
would be significantly different from a remedy designed for Hispanics. If one
school served blacks, Hispanics, and Asian-Americans, for example, a dif-
ferent remedial strategy might be appropriate for each subgroup within that
community.
If culturally specific remedies for unequal educational performance are
required, some classrooms within schools will be segregated. As children
progress through the grade levels, however, the compensatory elements of
the remedy should become less necessary. As minority students become
more literate in "standard" English, their need for a culturally specific
remedy will gradually fade away. When the appropriate curricula for stu-
dents begin to coincide, education can proceed in a common classroom on a
common ground.1
42
'4' For a discussion of which governmental entities will bear the responsibility of
discharging the remedial duty, see infra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
142 This is also the goal of bilingual programs. See Cintron v. Brentwood Union
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Devising a remedy that adequately addresses the unequal educational
performance of a disadvantaged minority population will require careful
analysis of the educational areas in which the group's performance lags.
Programs must be developed to diagnose and compensate for the causes of
depressed educational performance. Such a diagnostic methodology is far
from unprecedented in state and federal statutory law. The Education of All
Handicapped Children Act, 14 3 for example, requires participating states to
develop annual "individualized educational programs" to meet the special
educational needs of handicapped children entitled to governmental assis-
tance.144
This federal statute can provide a procedural model for devising appropri-
ate curricular responses to the educational deprivation suffered by minority
populations. It cannot, of course, provide the substantive principles for
determining the causes of performance gaps and what should be done to cure
them. These issues must be left to educational experts. Law can provide the
constitutional principles, goals, and required end-states. 145 It can require
procedures for achieving those goals. But in devising a substantive response
to the causes of educational deprivation, the lawyer must yield to the
educator.
D. Required End-States and Instrumentalism: Federalism, Separation of
Powers, and Adequate Measures
A third order right of equal educational performance requires the consid-
eration of two questions regarding the allocation of administrative responsi-
bility. First, what role should the federal judiciary play in vindicating the
right of equal educational performance? Second, how should responsibility
Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 59-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Bilingual program "ex-
pected to produce a level of language proficiency such that by the time the student
reaches the sixth grade, all courses can be taught entirely in English.").
143 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1453 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
144 Section 1401 provides:
[T]he term 'individualized education program' means a written statement for
each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a representative of the local
educational agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to
provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the
unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or guardian of
such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which statement shall include
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child,
(B) a statement of annual goals, . . . (C) a statement of the specific educational
services to be provided to such child, . .. (D) the projected date for initiation
and anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria
and evaluation procedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual
basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976).
14s "End-state" refers to the social condition which satisfies the government's
affirmative remedial duty.
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for discharging the affirmative remedial duty be allocated between the states
and localities, traditionally responsible for providing public education?
146
1. Process, End-States, and Affirmative Instrumentalism
Whereas predominant equal protection analysis proscribes the intrusion of
illegitimate considerations into the decisionmaking process, the educational
right created by contemporary judicial doctrine envisions a required end-
state. Once the government engages in significant actions motivated by
discriminatory intent, it bears an affirmative duty to create a system that is
integrated in fact. The notion of an affirmative remedial duty presumes an
ultimate goal, whether that end-state consists of the system as it would have
existed "but for" past discrimination, a systemwide racial balance, or a
condition of equal educational performance.
A court's ability to determine whether a governmental body is adequately
endeavoring to fulfill its affirmative duty depends on the speed with which
the required end-state can be achieved. When that end-state is defined
purely in terms of racial balance, it will be evident whether a locality has
undertaken measures that will eventually eliminate the vestiges of a dual
system. Racial balance can be quickly achieved through busing or other
similar means. When the required end-state demands equal educational
performance, however, it is more difficult to determine whether the respon-
sible governmental body is appropriately seeking to discharge its duty.
47
Educational performance cannot be equalized overnight. Once the responsi-
ble authority has taken identifiable steps toward achieving that end, the
reviewing court must determine the adequacy of those steps toward dis-
charging the constitutional obligation.
2. Discharging the Affirmative Remedial Duty: Conditions of Judicial
Intervention
Since the required end-state of equal educational performance cannot be
immediately achieved, the government's failure to eliminate depressed
1446 See infra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
147 The question of whether the remedial duty has ultimately been fulfilled, rather
than whether the duty is being adequately addressed for that moment, can most
easily be answered if the constitutionally required end-state is defined in terms of
equal group performance. If the required end-state is racial balance, however, it is
difficult to define standards for determining whether the government has completely
vindicated the rights of minority students. Perhaps because the ultimate goal of the
right remains unclear, the Court has not adequately defined the conditions under
which the affirmative duty may be deemed ultimately fulfilled. Thus, the Court has
left uncertain the constitutionally required period during which racial balance must
be maintained before the duty has been discharged. But cf. Pasadena City Bd. of
Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976) (remedial duty discharged when terms
of rigid remedial plan literally fulfilled).
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minority performance should not itself be sufficient to trigger judicial
intervention. Some range of democratic discretion should be preserved.
148
The existence of a performance gap, therefore, should trigger an affirmative
remedial duty on the part of the "democratic" branches of government.
149
Those branches will have committed a violation warranting judicial interven-
tion only if they fail to satisfy this affirmative remedial duty. Courts must,
therefore, determine whether the remedial process chosen by the entity
responsible for discharging the duty is constitutionally adequate. This judi-
cial responsibility requires a definition of the standards by which these
"democratically" chosen remedial measures should be evaluated. At what
rate must improved minority educational performance be accomplished?
What commitment of governmental resources is adequate? What substantive
programs fulfill the constitutionally imposed affirmative duty?
A third order right is justifiable because the interests of the class it seeks to
protect are paramount. Because of the extreme moral compulsion that
justifies a right's third order status,ISO the range of legitimate democratic
discretion in choosing a remedial process should be pegged around an
axis of practicability-what can possibly be achieved-rather than of
practicality-what can "efficiently" be achieved. 5 ' If courts were to define
148 It can hardly be denied that the American system values democratic decision-
making over the judicial process when other fundamental values would not be
compromised. The people, in general, are more trusted than are platonic guardians.
Once the democratic process has been appropriately circumscribed to take account
of those competing values, further restriction of democratic discretion would not be
justified.
149 Cf. Dayton 11, 443 U.S. at 537 (commission of systemwide violation triggers
continuing duty to eradicate effects of that system).
The end-state of equal educational performance more clearly establishes principles
for defining ultimate compliance than does the end-state of integration. Because the
governmental obligation is predicated on the illegitimate correspondence of race and
class, its duty will have been finally discharged when equal educational performance
has been achieved for a sufficient time to ensure that the social mobility of the victim
class is proportionate to that of the white population. Principles for defining constitu-
tionally adequate means toward that end, however, must be developed.
150 See supra note 86.
15 Title VII, for example, defines concerns about the discriminatory impact of
facially neutral acts around an axis of practicality. Employment criteria may legiti-
mately impose a discriminatory impact on disadvantaged minorities only if those
criteria are related to skills necessary for job performance. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The Act proscribes not only overt discrimina-
tion, but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation. The
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited."). But whether a hiring examination such as the one used to select police
officers in Washington v. Davis, see supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text,
selects "over-qualified" recruits, or whether it is precisely "job related," it can still
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their standard of review around an axis of mere practicality, they will have
created a balancing test without a calibrated balance. Other governmental
goals might then legitimately be weighed against the goal of achieving equal
have a discriminatory impact. Job-related exams simply reduce the severity of the
impact. Title VII does not reflect a second order principle. Employers are responsible
for manifestations of societal discrimination in general, not just those for which
they are directly responsible.
In considering the government's remedial obligations in the context of a second
order right, the notion of job-relatedness is theoretically irrelevant. The government
must make victims whole "but for" the effects of its past transgressions. The
postulation of a second order right to be free from the continuing effects of past
unconstitutional action logically implies a remedy that goes beyond merely requiring
job-relatedness. The issue concerns the continuing disadvantage caused by past
governmental actions suffered by applicants in current governmental programs. If
there is a constitutional right to be free from such lingering effects, then the govern-
ment should cure the disparate impact.
One might, nevertheless, eschew a slavish adherence to principle, and advocate a
limited remedy for a violation of the second order right. Individual rights must be
balanced against social costs and needs, and the criterion of job-relatedness perhaps
might provide the appropriate balance. Individual rights could thus be balanced
against social costs and needs. An argument can be made that hiring quotas should
never be mandated when unqualified persons would be selected to perform important
public tasks, even if those hired by the quota were unqualified solely because of past
governmental wrongs. But the validity of limiting the scope of remedial responsibility
by considerations of social necessity is not self-evident. When a right has been
violated because of past governmental misconduct, and the government has been
deemed to have a continuing obligation to remedy the lingering effects of this past
misconduct, an appropriate remedy would arguably require the government to do
everything possible to place disadvantaged applicants in the position they would have
enjoyed "but for" past unconstitutional acts. The social costs of placing less than
qualified persons in positions of public responsibility will be spread evenly among the
entire population, just as any compensation to private victims of past governmental
harms should be. Police detectives might not find as many criminals and firemen
might not extinguish fires as quickly, but harmed individuals will be compensated,
and constitutional rights vindicated. The burdens of past societal wrongs will be
borne by society as a whole.
Surely, however, even if the scope of a right includes all "but for" effects, the form
of its remedy need not be specific compensation. If exigencies of life require a
minimal competence of important public functionaries, social justice must yield to
social realities. But this observation argues against the form-not the scope-of the
remedy. If there is a right to be free from the continuing effects of past state wrongs,
then the appropriate remedy will not necessarily be a "but for" specific performance,
but some reasonable compensatory substitute-perhaps damages. The issue of dam-
ages raises numerous complex issues of causation and the normative concern of
individual compensation versus compensation to all members of a status group. See
generally B. BITTKER, supra note 1, at 59-67, 71-90. Damages could conceivably be
awarded to the entire group of unsuccessful black applicants, discounting the award
by an amount representing the chance that any person would have been unqualified
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educational performance. 152 The social disadvantages of waiting a half-
century to achieve educational equality could be legitimately counterbal-
anced against the advantages of building a new highway or reducing property
taxes. If such inquiries were permitted, the affirmative remedial duty would
be toothless. Like the rights of free expression and the free exercise of
religion, and the right against intentional racial discrimination, the right of
equal educational performance should be playable as a constitutional trump
card. If a legislatively chosen remedial program falls below the realm of the
practicable, the government should at least be forced to demonstrate a
compelling countervailing interest in order to justify its actions.
Thus, to determine whether the government is discharging its affirmative
remedial duty, courts should ask whether the responsible governmental
entities have adequately diagnosed the causes of unequal educational per-
formance and whether they have prescribed a remedial program that will
compensate for these causes as quickly as practicable. But how can a
reviewing court determine whether the government is satisfying the re-
quirement of practicability? Under what circumstances should the court be
permitted to substitute its own notions of a constitutionally adequate remedy
even without past invidious state acts. A discussion of damages in this context raises
significant questions of sovereign immunity, of course, but otherwise they would
consititute a reasonable substitute remedy. Victims will be made whole, or compen-
sated to the greatest extent possible. The burden of compensation will be spread
evenly throughout society.
If the employment right were not limited to the "but for" effects of past gov-
ernmental discrimination, but instead extended to preclude all disparate impact, the
theory underlying this right and the class of persons to which the right extended
would be broader. No predicate of governmental causation would be needed; rather,
the primary concern would be to redress the starting point disadvantages suffered by
members of chronically deprived groups.
152 Professor Perry has advocated a definition of discrimination under the four-
teenth amendment reaching governmental actions that were not undertaken with
discriminatory intent but that do impose a discriminatory impact on minorities. He
expressed the view, however, that the Constitution should not proscribe all such
actions but only should require that government officials take due account of the
disproportionate impact of their acts, and to balance that impact against other policy
considerations. Under his theory,
the bare fact of disproportionate impact has limited significance. The fact of
disproportionate impact does no more than trigger application of the dispropor-
tionate impact standard of review. At this point, factors other than dispropor-
tionate impact become crucial, principally the private interest, in relation to
which there is a disproportionate impact, and the public interest, the pursuit of
which by means of the challeged law or practice has a disproportionate impact.
Perry, supra note 58, at 563. Perry left unclear, however, the criteria for determining
whether a particular interest is sufficient to justify the disproportionate impact. See
supra note 58.
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for that chosen by the "democratic" branches of government?' 53 The de-
termination of how much educational progress is practicable raises difficult
questions; reviewing courts could be confronted by the conflicting views of
educational "experts."1
54
But courts need not choose among competing educational theories in
reviewing a challenged remedial process. Because the question is raised in
the context of a right requiring a particular end-state, the adequacy of a
challenged program can also be evaluated by its results. If the responsible
governmental entity has selected a program that achieves little or no narrow-
ing of the performance gap after a diagnostically significant period of time,
the program should presumptively be invalid.' 55 If, however, a program
,"I If the responsible governmental entity has not initiated some form of diagnostic
and remedial program aimed at eliminating the performance gap, and if a plaintiff
could establish the government's affirmative remedial duty by proving the existence
of such a gap, a reviewing court should find a violation as a matter of law and exercise
its remedial discretion to implement an affirmative remedy. Under such circum-
stances, a court could order the responsible governmental entity to devise a remedial
plan, or could rely exclusively on court-appointed experts to devise its own plan. See
Swann, 402 U.S. at 7 (discussing fact that district court had ordered school board to
present plan for faculty and student desegregation); Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 271 (after
remedial decree struck down by Court, state and local defendants ordered to submit
new desegregation plans). The standard used by courts to evaluate a plan devised by
a locality once a violation has been found should be more stringent than that used to
evaluate proposals developed and implemented prior to judicial intervention. Once a
violation has been established, the judiciary need not defer to democratic decisions.
154 Such a basis for ascertaining the adequacy of a remedial program, especially
when the constitutional standard consists of practicability, would be wholly unsatis-
factory. The range of professional disagreement is broad and judicial expertise is
minimal. See infra note 155.
155 Although this might suggest that a remedial program cannot be challenged until
after it has been in effect for a period sufficient to allow empirical evaluation of
constitutional adequacy, the program might be challenged earlier on purely theoreti-
cal grounds. Plaintiffs presenting such a challenge would face a heavy burden of
proof, and might even be faced with the task of proving a locality's bad faith. Bad
faith might be demonstrated if a defendant could present no reputable body of
educational theory that would support its diagnosis and chosen program. Because of
the significant range of professional disagreement over theories of educational harm
and remedial responses, see generally Dillingofsky, Sociolinguistics and Reading:
A Review of the Literature, in 33 THE READING TEACHER 307, 308-11 (Jan. 1979)
(survey of theories on relationship between language and reading achievement), a
challenge predicated solely on educational theory without any empirical evidence
would rarely be successful.
Defining a diagnostically significant period of time is an important judicial task.
Courts could, for example, develop a "sliding scale" approach for evaluating reme-
dial programs. A program that had not produced results shortly after its inception
would be entitled to less deference than one challenged before implementation.
Alternatively, courts might establish a two-tier approach, designating programs that
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triggers significant improvement in the educational performance of disadvan-
taged minorities, the program should be presumptively valid. In challenging
such a successful program, plaintiffs should bear the burden of proving that
another educational strategy will yield better results.
15 6
By pegging the stringency of judicial review to the results achieved, courts
can strike the appropriate constitutional balance between the values underly-
ing the third order right and those that favor decisions made by the demo-
cratic process. The more progress the government makes toward achieving
equal educational performance, the more likely that it is fulfilling its affirma-
tive obligation to ensure equal educational performance at the maximum
practicable rate. Judicial intervention would then less likely be warranted.
Good faith efforts to achieve equal educational performance at the maximum
practicable rate would likely yield significant results, and therefore can
insulate the democratic process from judicial intervention. 15 7
3. Allocating Remedial Responsibility
The responsibility for ensuring equal educational performance must be
allocated among different levels of government. This Article has posited a
third order right of equal educational performance. Governmental remedial
responsibility is predicated not on contemporary or past discriminatory
intent, but on the state's decision to provide education. 15 8 As in Brown, if
had not been in effect for an adequate period of time to be beyond empirical
challenge. Under this approach, courts could evaluate plans by the more deferential
standards of a theoretical challenge until a diagnostically significant period of time
had passed.
156 Such proof might include establishing the fact that better results had been
achieved by other school districts that had employed different remedial approaches.
Plaintiffs should bear the burden of proving that the causes of educational harm in
their home districts were similar in relevant aspects to those achieving better results.
157 A good faith standard of review, however, would be far too deferential. By
attaching the presumption of validity to programs yielding significant results, courts
can strike an appropriate balance between the compelling remedial entitlements of
the plaintiff class and the discretion of the defendants while remaining within the
limits of special judicial competence.
158 Could a state evade remedial responsibility simply by ceasing to provide public
education? Could it reduce its obligation by providing public education only through
grade six? Because such actions most likely would be undertaken with the intent to
evade its obligation to disadvantaged minority students, a state that ceased to provide
public education would be acting with the discriminatory intent proscribed by first
order equal protection analysis. Given the history of public education and the fact
that state programs, though perhaps not constitutionally mandated, are nevertheless
universal, the motivation behind cessation or reduction of public education in the
face of an affirmative remedial duty would be transparent. Cf. Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The Court in
Arlington Heights stated that "[s]ometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds
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members of disadvantaged minority groups benefit less from that education
than do white students, the government must discharge an affirmative reme-
dial duty.'1 9
other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face." Id. at 266. Moreover, "when there is proof
that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision ... judicial
deference is no longer justified." Id. at 265-66 (citation omitted). But cf. Crawford v.
Board of Educ., 102 S. Ct. 3211 (1982). In Crawford, the Court declared that the
repeal of a state constitutional provision proscribing "de facto" segregation did not
violate the fourteenth amendment because it simply brought the state constitution in
line with the federal Constitution. The Court relied on the critical factor that there
was "no reason to challenge the court of appeal's conclusion that the voters of the
state were not motivated by a discriminatory purpose." Id. at 3222. The situation in
Crawford is distinguishable from the hypothetical elimination of public education in
the context of a third order remedial duty because California merely made the
formerly more powerful state substantive standards consonant with the federal
constitutional standard. The elimination or restriction of public education, in the
context of an affirmative constitutional duty to ensure equal educational perfor-
mance, circumvents those federal constitutional requirements. Perhaps because Cali-
fornia's constitutional provision was far less entrenched than is the general consen-
sus of the state's responsibility to provide public education, the Court was reluctant
to overturn a lower court's finding that repeal of a governmental experiment was not
motivated by discriminatory intent.
This theory of the state's obligation to provide public education in the context of an
affirmative duty to promote equal educational performance rests on first order princi-
ples proscribing discriminatory intent. It is plausible, however, to posit an affirmative
duty to provide public education, unrelated to discriminatory intent; such a theory
would be more consistent with the principles and values supporting a third order right
of equal educational performance. See infra note 164.
is9 The issue here is not whether the absence of an intent requirement violates the
traditional "state action" concerns of the fourteenth amendment. The "'state action"
doctrine has served primarily to distinguish between private acts and public respon-
sibility. It has defined the circumstances under which the state may be accountable
for the acts of "private" citizens, see, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961) (agency of the State of Delaware liable under the fourteenth
amendment for racial discrimination practiced by a "private" restaurant tenant in
public facility); Polk County v. Dodson, 450 U.S. 963 (1981) (suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against local government alleging malpractice of a public defender dismissed
for want of state action), and those circumstances under which a "private" party
may be held accountable for standards imposed by the government, see, e.g., Flagg
Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (private warehouseman's sale of goods to
satisfy a debt pursuant to permissive statute held not state action). Although at least
one commentator has argued that "the de facto-de jure distinction presents a state
action decision in pristine form" because "de facto" segregation was caused by
private acts, J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 471
(1978), this argument was made in the context of a traditional conceptualization of the
underlying right. Furthermore, even in that context, the argument is fallacious. The
intent requirement is far more restrictive than the "state action" issue; state deci-
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Because the states, by long-lived common practice, have provided educa-
tion through local school districts, 160 it is appropriate that local school
districts bear the burden of diagnosing the educational problems of local
minority populations and prescribing adequate remedial responses. Indeed,
local authorities, already familiar with local conditions, are well-situated to
diagnose the causes of unequal educational performance and to tailor effec-
tive remedial programs to meet particular local concerns. This initial alloca-
tion of discretion in choosing remedial policies is consistent with the value of
local control that has pervaded several Supreme Court cases.
161
Local school districts should not bear the costs of developing and imple-
menting remedial programs, however, because it is hardly just to place the
burden of a constitutionally required remedy on the victims. Furthermore,
Milliken I and Milliken II demonstrate that the locality in which deprivation
is most severe will be least able to achieve a remedy on its own.' 62 Thus,
because the third order right eliminates the remedial limitations imposed by
predicating remedial responsibility on past invidious intent, the states, hav-
ing undertaken the ultimate responsibility for providing public education,
63
must bear the extra costs incurred toward achieving equal educational per-
formance. In this way, the broadest possible segment of society will bear the
burden of a just reconstitution of the American social structure.1
64
sions might cause segregation as an unintended consequence of actions undertaken
toward implementing other goals.
Rather, the issue here concerns whether the Constitution has imposed a responsi-
bility upon the government. State responsibility may be determined only in the con-
text of the asserted underlying right: "[c]onstitutional rights define the characteris-
tics of unconstitutional state action." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1159 (1978). The issue for establishing state and local liability for unequal educational
performance does not rest on a distinction between "private" and "public" acts, but
rather on defining the extent of the governmental obligation. Clearly, the government
is a public actor. Equally clear is the fact that a third order right imposes an obligation
on the government that will be breached if education fails to benefit disadvantaged
minority students as much as their white counterparts.
160 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("By and large, public
education in our nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.").
161 See Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1972).
162 See supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
163 The state's affirmative obligation is predicated on its provision of public educa-
tion through local instrumentalities. It bears the ultimate remedial responsibility.
Because a third order remedial obligation does not depend on a predicate of invidious
intent, past or contemporary, the distinction between state and local decisionmaking,
central in Milliken I, is irrelevant.
164 This raises the issue of whether a third order right of equal educational perfor-
mance can and should apply to the federal government. Imposing such an obligation
would certainly spread the costs of discharging the remedial obligation throughout all
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E. Equal Educational Performance and Cultural Legitimacy
The presumption that the achievement of equal educational performance
requires equal competency in traditional English language, reading, and
expression is not without serious normative consequences. It can be force-
of American society, and therefore would impose the smallest burden on the ben-
eficiaries. It would thus arguably allocate the remedial obligation along more just
and rational principles.
Why should the affirmative remedial obligation be predicated on a prior choice to
provide public education? Are the normative premises of a third order educational
right consistent with such a limitation or are they, indeed, undermined by that
limitation? If the government does not provide public education, will there not be
even greater disparity between the educational development of disadvantaged
minorities and members of more privileged groups? Is not the provision of public
education, therefore, the first essential affirmative obligation toward eliminating
racial caste?
There are primarily two arguments against constitutionally defining such an
affirmative obligation. First, to impose a governmental obligation where there is no
prior governmental involvement may seem to be the most radical example of pulling
rights from the air. Unlike a situation in which the government provides education
that imposes a disparate impact on different cultural groups, and in which, therefore,
the government can be said to be actively disadvantaging minority students, it cannot
be said that the federal government is actively disadvantaging minority students here.
Yet, although traditional equal protection doctrine focuses on the affirmative actions
of the government, such a limitation in the context of a third order right would be
more formalistic than normatively rational. Under a third order right, governmental
responsibility is predicated on the acute remedial needs of the beneficiary class. See
supra note 133. To argue that the government bears an affirmative duty to satisfy
those needs because it provides education but does not bear such an obligation if it
chooses not to provide public education is to lose sight of ultimate goals.
Professor Tribe's analysis of the preliminary issue in "state action" analysis is
relevant here as well. See supra note 159. The proposition that "constitutional rights
define the characteristics of unconstitutional state action" may logically extend to the
conclusion that the parameters of a constitutional right should dictate the extent of
governmental obligation. In the context of a third order right, the requirement of
prior state involvement as a predicate for an affirmative remedial duty would be
logically and normatively unnecessary.
Second, imposing a remedial obligation on the federal government is arguably a
greater intrusion on the democratic process than is a third order obligation imposed
on states and localities. The provision of primary and secondary education has
traditionally been a concern of state and local governments. Nevertheless, because
the democratic decision to provide education is so taken for granted and so far
removed from a decision to ensure equal educational performance, imposing the
affirmative remedial duty on the federal government arguably infringes on the demo-
cratic process no more than does imposing it on states and localities. Preservation of
the democratic process has been a subordinate value in the Court's pursuit of
educational rights, and indeed should be, given traditional concerns for "discrete and
insular minorities" and their incapacity in democratic forums. See United States v.
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fully argued that the constitutional violation should rest not on society's
failure to indoctrinate disadvantaged minorities into middle class "Anglo"
culture, but on its failure to incorporate minority cultures into its economic
power structure. Fluency in Spanish, competency or even poetic artistry in
Black English, have little value in the marketplace only because those with
market power are part of a different culture. How different American society
would be if those of ghetto cultures controlled the economic resources.
In confronting the dilemma of how best to ensure the elimination of racial
caste, the issue of cultural genocide must be considered. Given the existing
market structure, does the achievement of competitive economic parity
among various racial and ethnic groups require a homogenization of Amer-
ican cultures, and the concomitant elimination of minority cultures? Must
the home cultures of ethnic minorities be displaced by an external culture?
Displacement is not inevitable. Bilingual education can provide a mean-
ingful model for multicultural education, enabling children to maintain their
home cultures while gaining familiarity with the culture of the economic
power structure. 165 Both multicultural education and education monocul-
turally provided, however, will compromise the autonomy of minorities to
some extent. 166 Although it may be argued that minority students should not
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). Federal -responsibility is
implicated by a third order right which unambiguously favors the value of educational
equality over that of democratic discretion. Ironically enough, the textual foundation
for such an "anti-democratic" affirmative duty rests in the due process clause of the
fifth amendment, into which an "equal protection component" was incorporated by
Boiling. See supra note 40.
Such a theory of governmental responsibility, predicated on the discriminatory
impact created when public education is not provided, obviates the necessity of
finding discriminatory intent if the government were to attempt the abolition or
retrenchment of public education in order to evade its constitutional obligation. See
supra note 158.
165 Although bilingual education has been advocated in pursuit of cultural
pluralism, it also has been promoted as a means of achieving the assimilation of
different cultural groups. See, e.g., Otheguy, Thinking About Bilingual Education: A
Critical Reappraisal, 52 HARV. EDUC. REV. 301, 303 (1982). The distinction is
primarily one of emphasis, for some degree of bilingual education is necessary if
English is to be taught effectively. Bilingual education can, but need not necessarily,
encompass bicultural education. The issue, therefore, is whether the subjects taught
are diversified beyond the employment of a child's home language and the "Anglo"
language. See also Foster, Bilingual Education: An Educational and Legal Survey, 5
J. OF L. & EDUC. 149, 154-55 (1976) (considering range of structures and purposes of
bilingual programs).
166 That is, by requiring a person of one culture to learn the rudiments of another,
there is inevitably a degree of displacement of the home culture. By living in a society
in which competence in the majority culture is necessary for success in the arenas of
achievement, those of minority cultures-are faced with the choice of learning a
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be forced to learn the essentials of "Anglo" culture, some individual choice
must be sacrificed as long as our multicultural society is ruled by a monocul-
tural structure of economic power. Criticizing a multicultural curriculum
because it requires effective exposure to the "Anglo" culture ignores the
choice-limiting aspects of the contemporary exclusion from social and eco-
nomic power.
Indeed, members of the white majority could eventually face similar
issues of cultural independence. As minority students become better equip-
ped to compete effectively for jobs and other economic benefits, economic
stratification will begin to lose its correspondence with race and ethnicity.
Members of minority cultures will begin to control economic resources, and
those cultural characteristics that are demanded and rewarded will be re-
defined. English might ultimately lose its monopoly as the linguistic pre-
requisite for success in America; monolingual individuals could well be left
at a professional or business disadvantage.
These issues of educational policy implicate fundamental questions about
the nature of American society and the meaning of equal protection in a
nation built upon many cultures. To what extent should the government
recognize and foment cultural orthodoxy? Should the government bear an
affirmative duty to preserve the integrity of different cultures while promot-
ing equal educational performance? These issues are necessary conse-
quences of Brown's implicit concern with racial caste and the structure of
American society. They must be considered whenever a society commits
itself to eliminating economic stratification that corresponds with cultural
variation. But although cultural legitimacy is clearly an important issue, it is
hardly the preeminent problem in a context of intractable social and eco-
nomic deprivation. Toward the goal of achieving true cultural integrity, in
which all cultural groups are equal in the structure of American society, the
first and most essential step is to ensure equal educational performance.
VII. CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACY, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE, AND THE
END OF RACIAL CASTE
By elevating substantive values to a level of special protection, the Con-
stitution impinges upon the democratic process. If Congress may not estab-
lish a national religion or prohibit abortion, for example, the range of demo-
cratic discretion has been circumscribed. The Constitution defines the limits
of democratic legitimacy. Some decisions may be made; others may not.
In 1954, the Supreme Court recognized the tension between democratic
discretion and another preferred constitutional value. By predicating the
invalidation of first order segregation on two distinct rationales, the Court
posed a normative dilemma that begged resolution. Boiling reflected the
different language and culture or failing to enter into the network through which
social benefits are distributed. In the long run, cultural displacement might become a
concern of the "Anglo" majority.
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EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
fundamental constitutional principle that democratic decisions should be
viewed as legitimate unless they were undertaken with discriminatory in-
tent. 167 Brown, however, elevated equal educational opportunity to the
167 Under no theory of constitutional interpretation can judges avoid normative
choice. The school of constitutional interpretation that perceives the judicial pro-
cess as simply a value neutral monitor of the democratic process, see, e.g., Boiling
347 U.S. 497; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4; J.H.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980), inadequately accounts for the values impli-
cated in the choice of criteria by which the democratic process is monitored.
Perhaps the most significant example of the non-neutrality of Bolling's process-
oriented equal protection principles occurs in the choice of those "discrete and
insular" groups entitled to special constitutional insulation from invidious demo-
cratic decisions. Before the development of these equal protection principles in the
1940's and 1950's, blacks could not rely on special judicial scrutiny of the democratic
process. The decision to elevate blacks as a protected group was itself ajudicial value
choice. The decision not to elevate other groups to a level of special protection is a
similar value choice, The Supreme Court's failure even to address the question of
whether gay people constitute a minority subject to popular animus, and thus
whether they are entitled to constitutional protection, reflects the fact that the
process school of equal protection, no less than Plessy's and Brown's substantive-
oriented school, is far from value neutral. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attor-
ney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (Supreme
Court affirmed without oral argument or opinion a lower court ruling upholding the
application of criminal penalties to private consensual sex between men in Virginia.).
The district court's choice of values in failing to recognize the arguably invidious
nature of the challenged statutory application is evident in its statement that
[w]ith no authoritative judicial bar to the proscription of homosexuality-since
it is obviously no portion of marriage, home or family life-the next question is
whether there is any ground for barring Virginia from branding it as criminal. If a
State determines that punishment therefor, even when committed in the home, is
appropriate in the promotion of morality and decency, it is not for the courts to
say that the State is not free to do so.
403 F. Supp. at 1202. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, deemed it appropriate to
strike down Virginia's antimiscegenation statute, arguably predicated on similar
state interests of protecting acceptable family life, on process-oriented equal protec-
tion grounds because the statute invidiously discriminated on the basis of race. See
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Race, therefore, defines a class which the
Court has recognized as entitled to special constitutional protection. Sexual orienta-
tion, however, although defining a class similarly subject to first order discrimination,
has not been recognized as an illegitimate factor in legislative decisionmaking. The
distinction in the treatment of these two classes rests in the application of judicially
chosen values.
Thus, with respect to the contention that judicial selection of protected constitu-
tional values is illegitimate, the "process" school of equal protection analysis is as
vulnerable to attack as is the "substance" school. That the courts are choosing
values must be recognized, and those values must be justified as appropriately
constitutional on their merits in the context of the purpose of the Constitution in the
American system. For an excellent exposition of the argument that normative choice
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status of a preferred constitutional value. The intent to treat the races
differently was not at issue. Rather, Brown was concerned with the adverse
impact on disadvantaged minority students of an educational system tailored
to the needs and desires of the white majority. Minority students had to
benefit from public education as much as did their white counterparts.
Affirmatively imposed segregation, because it precluded equal benefit, was
held unconstitutional.
In seeking to reconcile the competing values reflected in the Brown!
Boiling dichotomy, the Court has created a constitutionally unique second
order doctrine which undermines the integrity of both theories of right. The
contemporary doctrine protects Bolling's concerns with democratic discre-
tion in an unprincipled fashion. It renders unattainable Brown's ultimate
ideal of a casteless society. The goal of achieving true integration, not
merely in the classrooms but throughout all economic strata of society, is
implicit in the spirit of Brown. Brown's powerful moral force, the normative
irresistibility of principles seeking to eradicate disadvantage in education
disproportionately suffered by "discrete and insular" groups, appropri-
ately should prevail over the value of democratic control. The intent
"trigger" should be abandoned.
A clear definition of the educational right toward which the Court has been
groping for nearly three decades yields principles for framing an appropriate
remedy. A third order right, requiring the government to ensure that average
minority educational performance equals average white educational perfor-
mance in essential curricular areas, implies a remedy that compensates for
the educational effects of the particular conditions of disadvantage suffered
by minority populations. Democratic discretion remains, circumscribed to a
large extent by the affirmative remedial duty, but protected from judicial
intervention so long as there is meaningful progress toward the constitution-
ally mandated end.
Why is this right appropriately constitutional? Why is this interpretation of
the fourteenth amendment based on Brown and subsequent cases legitimate?
A third order right of equal educational performance resolves the normative
contradictions that have plagued judicial doctrine since the inception of the
BrownlBoiling dichotomy. It reflects substantive choices about what im-
plicitly has been deemed unacceptable in the structure of American society.
It promotes the interests of traditional beneficiaries of special constitutional
protection-those who cannot depend on the democratic process to treat
them without malice, let alone to promote their just social elevation. Demo-
cratic decisionmaking does not define the extent of legitimacy in a constitu-
tional system that embraces substantive values. If the structure of American
society is to be integrated, if the caste-like quality of race is to be eliminated,
the impetus must come from values imposed on the polity. The source must
be constitutional.
is inevitable in constitutional adjudication, see Brest, The Fundamental Rights Con-
troversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90
YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
